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INTRODUCTION
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks demonstrated in
horrifying fashion the serious threat posed by international
organizations that seek to cause mass destruction in the United
States. Several confirmed cases of terrorist groups attempting to
purchase or steal nuclear material have raised the chilling prospect
of an unconventional attack on U.S. soil that would result in
unparalleled destruction.' Because of the porous border and the
wide variety of methods that terrorist groups could use to construct,
deliver, and detonate a nuclear device in the United States, 2 supply-
side controls aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear
material and the knowledge of how to construct nuclear weapons in
the first place are likely to be the most effective means of preventing
nuclear terrorism.'
1. See infra notes 32-33, 49-50 and accompanying text.
2. Matthew Bunn of the Belfer Center for International Affairs at Harvard University
writes that
[i]f stolen or built abroad, a nuclear bomb might be delivered to the United
States, intact or in pieces, by ship or aircraft or truck, or the materials could be
smuggled in and the bomb constructed at the site of its intended use.
Intercepting a smuggled nuclear weapon or the materials for one at the U.S.
border would not be easy. The length of the border, the diversity of means of
transport, and the ease of shielding the radiation from plutonium or highly
enriched uranium all operate in favor of the terrorists. The huge volume of drugs
successfully smuggled into this country provides an alarming reference point.
MATrHEw BUNN ET AL., PROJECT ON MANAGING THE ATOM & NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE,
SECURING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS: SEVEN STEPS FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION, at v
(2002), available at http://www.nti.org/e-research/securing-nuclear-weapons-andmaterials_
May2002.pdf; see also GRAHAM T. ALLISON ET AL., AVOIDING NUCLEAR ANARCHY: CONTAINING
THE THREAT OF LOOSE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FISSILE MATERIAL 12-13 (1996)
(describing the porous border and "essentially infinite" means of delivering a nuclear device
into the United States).
3. Charles Curtis, president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, notes that
the most effective, and least expensive way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to
secure weapons and materials at the source. Acquiring weapons and materials
is the hardest step for the terrorists to take, and the easiest step for us to stop....
[E]very subsequent step in the process is easier for the terrorists to take and
harder for us to stop.
The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic
Offensive Reductions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs., 107th Cong. 6 (2002)
(statement of Charles Curtis, President, Nuclear Threat Initiative) (emphasis omitted),
available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statement/2002/August/Curtis.pdf.
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Unfortunately, the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s
has given terrorist groups new opportunities to acquire nuclear
material and know-how.4 The end of the Cold War signaled the end
of the East-West confrontation that was largely defined by an
extensive nuclear arms race,5 leaving both the United States and
Russia with extensive stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the nuclear
material and infrastructure to support their massive military-
industrial complexes.' In Russia, the economic difficulty that has
resulted from the end of the Soviet economic system and the
transition to a more liberalized economy has left the remnant
nuclear infrastructure insecure and in shambles.' Two problems in
particular are of serious concern given their potential conse-
quences for U.S. national security. First, there is a risk that
terrorist organizations could acquire assembled warheads and
weapons-grade fissile material that are currently stored in facilities
with inadequately funded security systems.' Second, the nuclear
4. See infra Part I.A. See generally ALLISON ET AL., supra note 2, at 20-48 (discussing
Russia's insecure nuclear facilities).
5. Between 1945 and 1991, each U.S. presidential administration attempted to maintain
military superiority over the Soviet Union by constantly expanding and diversifying the
nation's nuclear arsenal. See ROBBIN F. LAIRD, THE SOVIET UNION, THE WEST, AND THE
NUCLEAR ARMS RACE 50-69 (1986) (chronicling U.S. nuclear weapon development activities
during the Cold War arms race); RONALD E. POWASKI, THE COLD WAR: THE UNITED STATES
AND THE SOVIET UNION 1917-1991, at 302 (1998) ("Each postwar administration experienced
pressure to build more nuclear weapons ...."). The Soviet Union sought to match the United
States' efforts to develop more advanced nuclear weapons because the nuclear balance of
power was deemed critical to the outcome of nearly all facets of the Cold War competition
between the superpower rivals, and the result was a constantly escalating arms race. See
POWASKI, supra, at 102-03, 134, 301-02.
6. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text; see also HOWARD BAKER & LLOYD
CUTLER, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, A REPORT CARD ON THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S
NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS WITH RUSSIA 3-4, 14 (2000), available at http://www.seab.
energy.gov/publications/rpt.pdf (indicating that there are at least 1000 metric tons of highly
enriched uranium and 150 metric tons of plutonium-enough to construct 40,000 nuclear
warheads-as well as 40,000 assembled nuclear warheads remaining in Russia after the Cold
War); GLENN E. SCHWEITZER, SWORDS INTO MARKET SHARES: TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMICS, AND
SECURITY IN THE NEW RUSSIA 144-45 (2000) (indicating that there are tens of thousands of
former weapons scientists and engineers still living in Russia after the Cold War); Ken
Luongo et al., The Crisis in Russia's Nuclear Cities, in REPAIRING THE REGIME: PREVENTING
THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 39, 39-40 (Joseph Cirincione ed., 2000)
(indicating that there are ten closed nuclear cities in Russia that were dedicated to nuclear
weapon design and production during the Cold War).
7. See infra notes 28-29, 34-39 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
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scientists that occupied the Soviet Union's secret "nuclear cities" are
unemployed, increasing the possibility that these scientists will sell
their knowledge to hostile nations or terrorist groups that seek
nuclear capabilities.9
In response to the nuclear threats posed by the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the subsequent economic downturn in Russia, the
United States initiated a number of bilateral assistance programs
to aid Russia in coping with its security shortcomings. 1" The
bilateral assistance programs, broadly referred to as Cooperative
Threat Reduction (CTR) projects," have been generally regarded as
very successful in preventing the spread of Russian nuclear material
and know-how to rogue states or terrorist groups.'2 The United
States has found it most effective to negotiate separate agreements
that are narrowly tailored to address specific problems. 3 Although
the programs generally enjoy broad support in the United States
and Russia, concerns about who should be responsible, and to what
extent, for damages that may arise if the projects go awry have been
a primary focus in many of the bilateral negotiations to begin CTR
projects.'
9. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
10. See Matthew Bunn, A Detailed Analysis of the Urgently Needed New Steps to Control
Warheads and Fissile Material, in REPAIRING THE REGIME: PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, supra note 6, at 71, 80-95 (surveying existing cooperative
U.S.-Russian nonproliferation assistance programs).
11. "Although CTR is the official name only of the DOD program, there is no other
convenient moniker with which to refer to all U.S. government efforts in this area." JAMES E.
GOODBY ET AL., CTR. FOR TECH. & NATL SEC. POLICY, NAT'L DEF. UNIV., COOPERATIVE THREAT
REDUCTION FOR A NEW ERA 1 n.1 (2004), available at http-J/www.ndu.edu/ctnspC
TR%20forO/o2Oa%2ONew/2OEra.pdf. For the purposes of this Note, "Cooperative Threat
Reduction" and "CTR" will be used to refer to all U.S. nonproliferation assistance programs
with Russia, regardless of whether they are conducted primarily by the Department of
Defense, the Department of Energy, or the Department of State. This approach is consistent
with most CTR literature. See, e.g., id.; Kenneth Luongo & William Hoehn, An Ounce of
Prevention, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Mar.-Apr. 2005, at 29, 35 n.1. If the agency that
implements a particular agreement is relevant to the discussion, it will be noted in the text.
12. See, e.g., BAKER & CUTLER, supra note 6, at 15 (noting the empirical success of current
CTR activities and the need for continued efforts and additional projects); Bunn, supra note
10, at 80-95 (same).
13. Jack M. Beard, Recent Development, A New Legal Regime for Bilateral Assistance
Programs: International Agreements Governing the "Nunn.Lugar" Demilitarization Program
in the Former Soviet Union, 35 VA. J. INTL L. 895, 896-900 (1995).
14. Id. at 916.
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Concomitant with the negotiation of the Soviet Nuclear Threat
Reduction Act of 1991,15 the United States and Russia successfully
negotiated an agreement (Umbrella Agreement) that held Russia
solely and unconditionally liable for any damages arising from CTR
activities. 6 More recently, however, Russia has rejected liability
provisions that mirror those of the CTR Umbrella Agreement when
negotiating specific nonproliferation assistance agreements that do
not fall under the Agreement. 17 Because the United States has
continued to insist that liability for all CTR activities be covered
under the Umbrella Agreement, no new CTR programs have been
initiated to continue the important work of securing Russia's
nuclear infrastructure, and numerous existing programs have
expired.18
The United States and Russia established two Department of
Energy (DOE) CTR assistance programs during the 1990s to
address specific problems plaguing Russia's nuclear industry, but
the countries deferred their concerns over liability.'9 First, the
Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) is designed to address the issue of
"brain drain" by converting Russia's former nuclear cities into
15. Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-228, tit. II 105 Stat.
1691, 1693 (codified as a note to 22 U.S.C. § 2551 (2000)).
16. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation
Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the
Prevention of Weapons Proliferation, U.S.-Russ., June 17, 1992, art. VII, Temp. State Dep't
No. 92-171, 1992 WL 466082 [hereinafter Umbrella Agreement] (providing the liability
provisions).
17. Joe Fiorill, U.S.-Russia: Legal Issues Threaten Nonproliferation Programs, GLOBAL
SECURITY NEWSWIRE, July 23,2003, http://www.nti.orgtd.newswire/issues/2003/7/23/7p.html
[hereinafter Fiorill, Legal Issues]; Joe Fiorill, U.S.-Russian Liability Dispute Could Bode Ill
for Threat Reduction Programs, GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE, Sept. 22, 2003, http://www.
nti.org/d-newswire/issues/2003/9/22/2p.html [hereinafter Fiorill, Liability Dispute].
18. See, e.g., R. Douglas Brubaker & Leonard S. Spector, Liability and Western
Nonproliferation Assistance to Russia: Time for a Fresh Look?, NONPROLIFERATION REV.,
Spring 2003, at 1, 2, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/voll0/101/101brub.pdf.
[The United States continues to demand that Russia accept full and
unconditional responsibility for damage claims .... This policy has placed major
new Western nuclear assistance programs in jeopardy, ... impeded the renewal
of agreements set to expire in 2003, ... and has paralyzed efforts to expand a
number of existing nonproliferation assistance programs.
Id.
19. See infra Part I.C-D.
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successful civilian enterprises.2" Second, the plutonium disposition
program is intended to assist Russia in constructing a Mixed-Oxide
Fuel (MOX) reactor that will consume thirty-four tons of excess
weapons-grade plutonium.21 The United States and Russia opted to
begin implementing these initiatives, agreeing to work out specific
liability provisions during the first few years of their existence.22 By
the middle of 2003, however, they had failed to negotiate a mutually
acceptable liability agreement for either program, and consequently,
the unfinished programs have expired and cannot be continued.2"
This Note will analyze the liability impasse that is hindering the
progress of present and future bilateral nonproliferation assistance
agreements between the United States and Russia, ultimately
recommending a solution that will prove acceptable to both parties.
Part I will survey existing Russian nonproliferation agreements
with the United States, focusing on the specific liability provisions
that govern each one. Part II will investigate the current contro-
versy between the United States and Russia concerning liability
provisions that govern CTR activities, explaining the difficulty of
negotiating liability provisions for CTR nonproliferation assistance
programs given the various interests of both countries. Part III will
analyze the feasibility and desirability of a number of approaches to
resolving the liability dispute between the United States and
20. See infra Part I.C. See generally Matthew Bunn, Stabilizing Employment for Nuclear
Personnel: The Nuclear Cities Initiative, NUCLEAR THREAT INrIATIVE, Nov. 27, 2002,
http://www.nti.orgte--research/cnwm/stabilizingnci.asp (describing the challenges associated
with converting former nuclear cities to civilian use and discussing the NCI).
21. See infra Part I.D. See generally Matthew Bunn, Reducing Excess Stockpiles: Russian
Plutonium Disposition, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, Oct. 3, 2003, http://nti.orgte-research/
cnwm/reducingtrpdispose.asp (describing the history of plutonium disposition efforts and
current prospects for disposing of Russia's excess weapons-grade plutonium).
22. See infra Part I.C-D.
23. Charles Digges, Technical Agreement for Plutonium Disposition Allowed to Lapse by
US, BELLONA, July 30, 2003, http://www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/navy/co-
operationl30596.html ("[T]he US government let expire a 1998 US-Russian agreement on
technical cooperation for plutonium disposition over concerns that the agreement did not
provide sufficient liability protections for US officials and contractors involved in the project
.... As a result, all new plutonium disposition planning ... legally has to be halted."); Fiorill,
Liability Dispute, supra note 17 (noting that the United States is "refusing to renew the
Nuclear Cities Initiative agreement ... because of concerns that liability language in the
agreement is inadequate to protect U.S. officials or workers in case of injuries or damages
arising from activities carried out under the initiative" and noting that "[n]o new projects
envisioned by the initiative will begin).
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Russia, providing recommendations that best accommodate the
interests of both sides.
I. THE HISTORY OF U.S.-RussIAN NONPROLIFERATION AGREEMENTS
AND THEIR LIABILITY PROVISIONS
A. The Collapse of the Soviet Union, the Threat of "Loose Nukes,"
and the Risk of ' Brain Drain"
Although a major armed conflict never occurred between the
United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, both
states devoted significant economic and human resources to
preparing for a full-scale nuclear conflict.24 Accordingly, the Soviet
Union developed an extensive military-industrial complex, which
was intended to mirror and surpass the United States' efforts to
amass and develop nuclear weapons, allowing the Soviet Union to
acquire a vast arsenal of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons
for waging war.25 Entire cities were constructed to serve this goal,
and thousands of nuclear physicists and other scientists that were
employed by the Soviet government for the sole purpose of develop-
24. See supra note 5. Professor Ronald E. Powaski of Cleveland State University writes
that
[t]he nuclear arms race also intensified and prolonged the Cold War.... After the
Soviets began to produce nuclear weapons and ... the means to deliver them to
U.S. targets, nuclear weapons became more important to the United States.
They were considered necessary not only to deter an attack on the American
homeland and on U.S. allies but also to counter a wide variety of other
communist challenges.... Each postwar administration experienced pressure to
build more nuclear weapons from the military-industrial complex, which
included the Pentagon, defense contractors, scientists in the nation's nuclear
weapons labs, and politicians with defense industries in their districts .... ITihe
military-industrial complex capitalized repeatedly on the public's fear of the
Soviet Union with exaggerated estimates of the Soviet capabilities.... The Soviets
felt compelled to keep up with their more technologically advanced adversary,
and, in time, they succeeded in matching in number if not quality virtually every
major U.S. nuclear weapon.
POWASKI, supra note 5, at 301-02.
25. See supra notes 5, 24; see also BAKER & CUTLER, supra note 6, at 3-4 (indicating that
there are 40,000 assembled strategic and tactical nuclear warheads remaining in Russia after
the Cold War).
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ing a nuclear arsenal occupied these "nuclear cities."26 Vast sums of
money were invested in development of nuclear weapons, resulting
in the production and stockpiling of 40,000 assembled warheads and
more than 1150 metric tons of weapons-grade fissile material.
With the end of the Cold War in 1991, the states of the former
Soviet Union were thrown into economic and political disarray."
Perhaps the greatest risk that accompanied this collapse was the
threat of 'loose nuclear weapons. '29 The end of the Cold War largely
eliminated the risk of global nuclear conflict between states, but
the threat of terrorist attacks became the primary challenge to
the United States' national security, as demonstrated by a number
of incidents during the last decade. 30 Although no terrorist acts
26. SCHWEITZER, supra note 6, at 144-45 (indicating that there are tens of thousands of
former weapons scientists and engineers still living in Russia after the Cold War); Luongo et
al., supra note 6, at 39-40 (indicating that there are ten nuclear cities in Russia that were
dedicated to nuclear weapon design and production during the Cold War); Bunn, supra note
20 ("More than a decade after the Cold War, Russia still has ten entire [nuclear] cities, where
nearly three quarters of a million people live, which were built only for the purpose of making
nuclear weapons and their essential ingredients.").
27. BAKER & CUTLER, supra note 6, at 3-5 (indicating that there are at least 1000 metric
tons of highly enriched uranium and 150 metric tons of plutonium, enough to construct 40,000
nuclear warheads, in addition to 40,000 assembled nuclear warheads remaining in Russia
after the Cold War).
28. See, e.g., PREM SHANKAR JHA, THE PERILOUS ROAD TO THE MARKET: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF REFORM IN RUSSIA, INDIA AND CHINA 22-68 (2002) (discussing the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the resulting economic crisis in Russia and the other former Soviet states).
See generally ROY MEDvEDEV, POST-SOVIET RUSSIA: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE YELTSIN ERA
(George Shriver ed. & trans., 2000) (discussing the post-Soviet economic and political chaos
in Russia).
29. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 2, at 1-7 (discussing the unprecedented risk of "nuclear
leakage" and terrorism created by Russia's insecure nuclear facilities); BAKER & CUTLER,
supra note 6, at 43 ("The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States
today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia
could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American
troops abroad or citizens at home."). Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard University has said that
[t]he so-called "loose nukes" in Russia are probably the greatest threat ... to our
national security. There are basically a thousand tons or more of Plutonium, and
highly-enriched Uranium. And it takes less than 10 pounds to make a nuclear
weapon. So that material getting in the wrong hands ... could be a tremendous
threat to us.
CNN The World Today: The Nuclear Threat: Russia's Arsenal Remains World's Largest Threat
(CNN television broadcast Mar. 24, 2000) (statement of Joseph Nye, Professor, Harvard
University, Kennedy School of Government).
30. See, e.g., Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec'y of Def., Testimony Prepared for Delivery to
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Mar. 23, 2004),
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directed against the population or interests of the United States or
other states have been launched with nuclear weapons yet, this
failure "must be assumed to be due to lack of means rather than
lack of motivation."'" Attempts by al-Qaeda to acquire nuclear
material are well documented,32 and several other attempted thefts
of nuclear material indicates that there is a demand for nuclear
material among terrorist groups, many of which are hostile to the
United States.
33
The collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically increased the risk
that terrorist organizations will succeed in acquiring fissile material
from Russia for several reasons. First, the end of the Soviet state
marked the end of state control over every aspect of life in the Soviet
Union. 34 One by-product of stringent centralized control was heavy
regulation and intense security measures for military facilities and
nuclear installations. 5 Second, the economic decline that accompa-
nied the transition to a market economy" exacerbated the problem,
as the fiscal situation in the former Soviet states, most notably
http://www.defenselink.mil]speeches/2004/sp2004O323-secdef0923.html (discussing the risk
of terrorism in a changing threat environment).
31. BUNN ET AL., supra note 2, at v.
32.
Osama bin Laden has called the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) a "religious duty." It is known that Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaida
terrorist network have made repeated attempts to buy stolen nuclear material
from which to make a nuclear bomb, and that they have also tried to recruit
scientists to help them with the task of weapon design and construction.... Al
Qaida is not the only terrorist group that might aspire to nuclear weapons.
Id. at 1 (footnote omitted); see also David Albright, Al.Qaeda's Quixotic Quest to Go Nuclear,
ASIA TIMEs, Nov. 22, 2002, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/DK22AkOl.html
("[C]aptured documents reinforce assessments that al-Qaeda is highly determined to obtain
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.").
33. BAKER & CUTLER, supra note 6, at 6-7 (discussing the facts of a number of actual
attempts to steal nuclear material from Russian installations); NATHAN E. BUSCH, No END IN
SIGHT: THE CONTINUING MENACE OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 118-19 (2004) (discussing
twenty-one known attempts to steal nuclear material from Russian installations between
1991 and 1999).
34. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 2, at 37 ("The foundations of the Soviet approach to nuclear
security were swept away in the transition from a closed totalitarian state to a more open,
more turbulent democratizing state.").
35. Id. at 2-3, 36-37 (discussing stringent Soviet-era nuclear security); BUSCH, supra note
33, at 117-18 (same).
36. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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Russia, made security programs impossible to fund.37 Graham
Allison summarizes the implications of post-Soviet disorder in
Russia:
The dramatic changes ... have produced political uncertainty,
economic distress, and social dislocation. For tens of millions of
Russians, hardship and deprivation are inescapable facts of
life.... [H]arsh economic conditions can create incentives for
nuclear theft and smuggling. For people who are poorly housed,
poorly fed, and poorly paid (when paid at all), there will be a
temptation to do what they can to improve their lives and secure
their futures. Russia's nuclear custodians face these pressures
as they preside over weapons and materials that are immensely
valuable to any state or group that covets nuclear weapons. It is
not hard to imagine that people leading bleak, uncertain, and
difficult lives might find irresistible the prospect of wealth and
security via the nuclear black market....
Organizations such as the Russian military and Minatom are
now operating in circumstances of great stress. Money is in short
supply, paychecks are irregular, living conditions unpleasant....
[D]isorder within Russia and the resulting strains within the
military could easily cause a lapse or a breakdown in the
Russian military's guardianship of nuclear weapons."
Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that
terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from
Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and
the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures."9
Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of
methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a
country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by
37. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 2, at 28-31 (surveying the implications of post-Soviet
economic decline on Russian nuclear security).
38. Id. (footnotes omitted).
39. Id. at 2 ('"he current trickle [of fissile materials leaking out of Russia] could well be
a harbinger of things to come. A burgeoning flow ... of nuclear-weapons materials, or perhaps
even of weapons themselves, has become a distinct danger given the conditions in which
nuclear assets are held in Russia."); BuscH, supra note 33, at 118 ("The [Material Protection,
Control, and Accounting] at Russian nuclear facilities was simply not designed to protect
materials in this new political and economic situation."); Jimmy Burns et al., Nuclear Theft
Causes Global Alert, FIN. TIMES, July 9, 2002, at 14.
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such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational
group that had obtained it in one of these ways.'' 4' Equally threaten-
ing, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile
material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little
material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear
weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the
technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not
significant.42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be
used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it
incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear
weapon once it was built.4' Accordingly, supply-side controls that
are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material
in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk
of nuclear terrorism.
44
Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for
maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and
the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000
nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was
collapsing.4 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there
40. BUNN ET AL., supra note 2, at v.
41. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 2, at 45-46 (indicating that less than twenty pounds of
plutonium or forty pounds of highly enriched uranium would permit terrorist organizations
to construct a variety of nuclear devices); BUNN ET AL., supra note 2, at v (same); Burns et al.,
supra note 39 (indicating that a baseball-sized piece of plutonium is adequate for constructing
a nuclear device).
42. ALLISON ETAL., supra note 2, at 55-62 (identifying a number of simple nuclear weapon
designs that are within the reach of terrorists with fissile material); BUNN ET AL., supra note
2, at 12 (citing several studies that confirm the ease with which terrorists could construct a
nuclear weapon after stealing fissile material); Bill Keller, Nuclear Nightmares, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., May 26, 2002, at 22 (articulating the ease of acquiring knowledge detailing how to
construct a nuclear device).
43. See supra note 2.
44. See supra note 3.
45. Luongo et al., supra note 6, at 39-40 (indicating that there are ten closed nuclear cities
in Russia that were dedicated to nuclear weapon design and production during the Cold War);
Bunn, supra note 20 ('With the end of the Cold War, a substantial part of the mission of the
nuclear facilities in these cities has disappeared, and government funding for these facilities
and the cities around them has plummeted.").
46. SCHWEITZER, supra note 6, at 144-45 (indicating that there are tens of thousands of
unemployed former weapons scientists and engineers still living in Russia after the Cold
War); Bunn, supra note 20 (indicating that there are at least 35,000 unemployed scientists
in Russia that formerly occupied the nuclear cities); see also supra note 28 and accompanying
text (discussing the post-Soviet economic collapse in Russia).
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are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or
underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling
prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear
knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist
organizations with nuclear ambitions.4"
The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear
knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass
destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist
attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of
immediate human and economic losses.49 Moreover, there would be
immense political pressure in the United States to discover the per-
petrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing
the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale
nuclear conflict.' In addition to the threat posed by terrorists,
leakage of nuclear knowledge and material from Russia will reduce
the barriers that states with nuclear ambitions face and may trigger
widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons.5' This proliferation
will increase the risk of nuclear attacks against the United States
47. Bunn, supra note 20.
48. Id. ("[E]mployees may be most tempted to sell nuclear knowledge or steal nuclear
material for sale ... when they know they will soon lose their jobs, but for the moment still
have access to nuclear secrets and materials-and for thousands in Russia's nuclear cities,
that time is now."); see also BAKER & CUTLER, supra note 6, at 1.
49. See, e.g., Albright, supra note 32 (indicating that a nuclear terrorist attack in the
United States would result in hundreds of thousands of deaths and have severe economic
impacts); Luongo & Hoehn, supra note 11, at 35.
50. Albright, supra note 32 ("The desire for revenge may lead the United States, or
perhaps its allies, to respond with nuclear weapons, eliminating the perpetrators if they could
be immediately identified, but likely causing untold suffering to civilian populations.");
Greenfield At-Large: America's New War: Nuclear Threats (CNN television broadcast Nov. 1,
2001) (statement of Gregg Easterbrook, Writer and Visiting Scholar, Brookings Institute),
available at http://transcripts.cnn.comiTRANSCRIPTS/0111/01/ gal.00.html ("[I]f an atomic
warhead goes off in Washington, ... in the 24 hours that followed, a hundred million Muslims
would die as U.S. nuclear bombs rained down on every conceivable military target in a dozen
Muslim countries.").
51. Nuclear leakage will enable states with nuclear ambitions to achieve their goal more
easily by reducing technical and cost barriers and by affording easy access to nuclear material
that is difficult to create. ALLISON ET AL., supra note 2, at 50-52. Moreover, nuclear leakage
creates incentives to proliferate and consequently risks triggering widespread nuclear
proliferation in an ever-widening circle of states. Id. at 53. Leakage of nuclear knowledge and
expertise increases the risk of widespread nuclear proliferation for similar reasons. Id. at 61-
62.
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or its allies by hostile states,5 2 as well as increase the likelihood that
regional conflicts will draw in the United States and escalate to the
use of nuclear weapons.53
B. U.S.-Russian Nonproliferation Agreements: Cooperative Threat
Reduction
Recognizing the risks that accompanied Russia's economic decline
and the concomitant inability to adequately secure assembled
nuclear weapons and fissile material, the United States deemed it
desirable to establish cooperative programs to control the emerging
nuclear threat. In December 1991, the U.S. Congress approved, and
President George H.W. Bush signed into law, the Soviet Nuclear
Threat Reduction Act of 1991, commonly referred to as the Nunn-
Lugar Act.54 The Act created a framework through which the United
States negotiates subsequent CTR agreements with the former
Soviet states to provide bilateral assistance through the Department
of Defense (DOD)55 for coping with specific issues related to
demilitarization in the post-Cold War world.5" The United States
has signed a number of CTR agreements with several former Soviet
52. See, e.g., Bradley A. Thayer, The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, 4 SECURITY STUD. 463, 465-66 (1995) (identifying a number
of scenarios in which horizontal nuclear proliferation could trigger nuclear attacks against the
United States or its interests).
53. See, e.g., ALLISON ET AL., supra note 2, at 71-72 (offering several hypothetical
situations in which nuclear proliferation to unstable regions of the world could trigger nuclear
conflicts that would draw in the United States). There is an extensive debate in the security
studies literature concerning whether nuclear proliferation increases or decreases the risk of
conflict between states, although the case has never been made that terrorist acquisition of
nuclear weapons would be desirable under any circumstances. A survey of the nuclear
proliferation literature and the arguments on both sides is beyond the scope of this Note, but
for an in-depth articulation of the competing arguments, see generally SCOTT D. SAGAN &
KENNETH N. WALTZ, THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A DEBATE (1995), which presents
Professor Sagan's argument that horizontal nuclear proliferation increases the risk of nuclear
conflict for multiple reasons and Professor Waltz's argument that nuclear proliferation
increases deterrence, reducing the risk of conflict between states, and SCOTT D. SAGAN &
KENNETH N. WALTZ, THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A DEBATE RENEWED (2d ed. 2003),
which updates, expands, and continues the dialogue from the earlier edition of the same book.
54. Pub. L. No. 102-228, tit. I, 105 Stat. 1691, 1693 (1991) (codified as a note to 22 U.S.C.
§ 2551 (2000)).
55. See supra note 11.
56. Beard, supra note 13, at 896-900 (describing generally the nature of CTR activities).
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states,57 and the success of these programs in reducing the national
security risks of the crumbling former Soviet nuclear infrastructure
is universally acknowledged.58 Given the hazards that accompany
activities involving nuclear material,59 there has been an intense
focus on the liability provisions that govern CTR assistance
programs."
To address legal and procedural issues regarding how CTR
projects will be implemented, the DOD negotiates an "umbrella
agreement" with any state that receives bilateral assistance for CTR
activities.6' The umbrella agreements provide a legal framework
that regulates issues regarding congressional funding, perfor-
mance and auditing, legal status for personnel, and liability.62 The
umbrella agreements also authorize the Secretary of Defense to
negotiate project-specific agreements that further specify how
particular CTR projects will be implemented, subject to the legal
and procedural limitations of the umbrella agreement.63
In June 1992, the United States and Russia concluded a number
of project-specific CTR implementing agreements, as well as an
umbrella agreement to govern all of the implementing agreements,
the Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation,
Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of
Weapons Proliferation, with Implementing Agreements and
Annexes (Umbrella Agreement).64 This document outlines a number
of cooperative CTR activities for which the United States provides
assistance to Russia, and it also contains the provisions concerning
the procedures that will be used for implementing all U.S.-Russian
57. In addition to agreements made with Russia, the United States has also signed CTR
agreements with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, which are the other three former Soviet
republics that housed Soviet nuclear forces during the Cold War. Id. at 897.
58. See, e.g., BAKER & CuTLER, supra note 6, at 4-5, 15 (noting the empirical success of
current CTR activities and the need for continued efforts and additional projects); Bunn,
supra note 10, at 80-95 (same).
59. See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
60. Beard, supra note 13, at 916.
61. Id. at 900-03 (providing an overview of the legal regime governing implementation of
CTR projects).
62. Id. at 900-20 (discussing the different components of CTR umbrella agreements).
63. Id. at 902-03.
64. Umbrella Agreement, supra note 16.
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cooperative CTR projects.65 In the Umbrella Agreement, Russia
agrees to waive all claims against the United States and any U.S.
contractors that might arise while the CTR projects are being
implemented.' Moreover, Russia agrees to bear responsibility for all
third-party claims that arise from implementation of the CTR
projects.6 v These broad provisions basically exempt the United
States and U.S. contractors from any liability for anything that
occurs pursuant to CTR activities, placing the burden of compensat-
ing all victims on Russia. Russia initially sought to limit the liability
protections in the Umbrella Agreement by creating an exception for
reckless, grossly negligent, or intentional conduct by the United
States or U.S. contractors. 8 The United States refused to accept any
limitation on liability protection for itself or its contractors for a
number of reasons, 9 although a provision was included to give the
United States discretion in providing compensation to the victims
of accidents that result from CTR activities and to prescribe
consultation between the United States and Russia in the event of
an incident.7 ° Since 1992, several other DOD project-specific CTR
implementing agreements have been reached between the United
65. See id. See generally Beard, supra note 13 (discussing the Umbrella Agreement).
66. The Umbrella Agreement provides that
[t]he Russian Federation shall, in respect of legal proceedings and claims, other
than contractual claims, hold harmless and bring no legal proceedings against
the United States of America and personnel, contractors, and contractors'
personnel of the United States of America, for damage to property owned by the
Russian Federation, or death or injury to any personnel of the Russian
Federation, arising out of activities pursuant to this Agreement.
Umbrella Agreement, supra note 16, art. VII, para. 1; see also Beard, supra note 13, at 916-20
(discussing generally the liability provisions of the Umbrella Agreement).
67. Umbrella Agreement, supra note 16, art. VII, para. 2 ("Claims by third parties, arising
out of the acts or omissions of any employees of the United States of America or contractors
or contractors' personnel of the United States of America done in the performance of official
duty, shall be the responsibility of the Russian Federation.").
68. Beard, supra note 13, at 917.
69. Jack M. Beard, Associate Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs and
Intelligence at the Department of Defense, notes that
the United States refused [to include Russia's proposed exceptions for "reckless,"
"grossly negligent," or "intentional" conduct] due to the difficulty in applying
these subjective terms to some of the inherently dangerous activities
contemplated, the limited U.S. authority for assuming potentially enormous
liabilities, the unilateral nature of the funding for these assistance activities and
the lack of direct U.S. control over many of the activities envisioned.
70. Umbrella Agreement, supra note 16, art. VII, paras. 3-4.
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States and Russia pursuant to the Umbrella Agreement.7 Several
of the CTR implementing agreements contain liability protections
above and beyond those included in the Umbrella Agreement,
going so far as to specify minimum equipment specifications and
to exempt U.S. contractors from any liability for accidents
resulting from the contractors' use of faulty materials or improper
procedures.72
C. The Nuclear Cities Initiative and "Brain Drain"
In September 1998, the United States and Russia concluded the
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Russian Federation on the
Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI).73 This Department of Energy (DOE)
CTR program focuses on consolidating the former Soviet nuclear
infrastructure by converting the former nuclear cities from defense
industry complexes into productive civilian cities with nondefense
employment opportunities for former nuclear scientists.74 The
purpose of the NCI's defense conversion activities is to solve the
problem of "brain drain," that is, the risk that former nuclear
scientists will sell their nuclear knowledge out of economic necessity
to other states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions.75
Transforming the former nuclear cities into civilian enterprises
builds on the existing industrial infrastructure by effectively
71. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 18 & 34 n.82 (listing all of the DOD CTR
agreements governed by the provisions of the Umbrella Agreement).
72. Beard, supra note 13, at 918-19.
73. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the.Russian Federation on the Nuclear Cities Initiative, U.S.-Russ., Sept. 22,
1998, Temp. State Dep't No. 98-167, 1998 WL 797949 [hereinafter Nuclear Cities Initiative
Agreement], available at http:www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/ fulltextinuccity/initiati.htm.
74. See BAKER & CUTLER, supra note 6, at 4-5, 31-33; Luongo et al., supra note 6, at 39-45
(describing the intent and past successes of the NCI, but noting that much more needs to be
done to create productive commercial enterprises to replace prior scientific and military
activities in Russia's nuclear cities); Bunn, supra note 20 ("NCI is the only U.S. program
focused directly on reducing the size of the Russian nuclear weapons complex and ensuring
that this reduction does not lead to mass unemployment and instability.").
75. See Luongo et al., supra note 6, at 39 ("The United States and Russia have launched
the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) to facilitate commercial development in these closed cities,
thereby providing alternative, peaceful employment for scientists and technicians that might
otherwise be forced to sell their nuclear-related skills to the highest bidder."); see also supra
notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
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providing new employment opportunities to those nuclear scientists
who have marketable skills and dangerous knowledge but no jobs.
Because the NCI is a DOE program, it is not subject to the
Umbrella Agreement that governs DOD activities, and accordingly,
the broad liability exemptions for the United States and U.S.
contractors do not automatically apply to NCI activities. 76 Instead,
in 1998, the United States compromised with Russia concerning
liability for NCI activities, and Russia agreed to exempt the United
States and U.S. contractors from any liability and to indemnify
them against any third-party claims, unless an incident arose from
"premeditated" actions. 7 Although the United States agreed to
these terms, the text of the NCI provided that the program would
only exist for five years and would be renewable at the will of the
76. See Justin Bernier, The Death of Disarmament in Russia?, PARAMETERS, Summer
2004, at 84, 92, available at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/O4Summer/
bernier.pdf (noting that the terms of the Umbrella Agreement do not apply to non-DOD CTR
projects absent Russian consent); see also supra note 11 (noting the distinction between
assistance programs funded by the DOD and those funded by other departments).
77. The NCI Agreement provides the following:
1. With the exception of claims against individuals for premeditated damage or
injury, the Government of the Russian Federation shall bring no claims or other
legal proceedings against the Government of the United States of America and
its personnel or its contractors, sub-contractors, consultants, suppliers, or
subsuppliers of equipment or services at any tier and their personnel, in any
court or forum, for any damage, including indirect, direct, or consequential
damage, arising from activities undertaken pursuant to this Agreement, to
property owned by the Russian Federation. This paragraph shall not apply to
legal actions brought by the Government of the Russian Federation to enforce
the provisions of contracts to which it or a Russian national or other legal entity
is a party.
2. With the exception of claims against individuals for premeditated damage or
injury, the Government of the Russian Federation shall provide for the adequate
defense of, shall indemnify, and shall bring no claims or other legal proceedings
against the Government of the United States of America and its personnel or its
contractors, sub-contractors, consultants, suppliers, or subsuppliers of
equipment or services at any tier and their personnel, in connection with third-
party claims, in any court or forum, for any injury or damage, including indirect,
direct, or consequential injury or damage, arising from activities undertaken
pursuant to this Agreement, occurring within or outside the territory of the
Russian Federation. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as
acknowledging the jurisdiction of any court or forum over third-party claims to
which this paragraph applies, nor shall it be construed as waiving the sovereign
immunity of either Party with respect to third-party claims that may be brought
against it.
Nuclear Cities Initiative Agreement, supra note 73, art. 8, paras. 1, 2 (emphasis added).
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parties.v8 In 2003, the agreement expired and the prospect of
renewal remains slim; the primary holdup is the renegotiation of
the liability provisions. v9 The DOE announced that it will not
support renewal of the NCI unless Russia accepts amendments to
the NCI's liability provisions that bring those provisions in line with
the broad protections outlined in the Umbrella Agreement.' The
Duma has refused to agree to employ the Umbrella Agreement's
liability provisions in connection with the NCI, and accordingly, the
agreement is unlikely to be renewed.8
The expiration of the NCI will not have dire short-term conse-
quences because the DOE and the Russian Ministry of Atomic
Energy (Minatom) have agreed to complete all sixty-nine NCI
projects that have already begun. 2 Unfortunately, future projects
aimed at defense conversion will be virtually impossible to complete
given the expiration of the NCI. 3 Moreover, the lack of success
between the United States and Russia in compromising to renew
the NCI because of the liability dispute may signal a lack of political
78. Id. art. 12, para. 1.
79. Paul Webster, Russia's Nuclear Cities: Swords-to-Plowshares Program Suffers
Meltdown, SCIENCE, Oct. 10, 2003, at 207, 207 ("Last month the U.S. government quietly
opted not to renew a 5-year agreement with Russia on the Nuclear Cities Initiative ....
Negotiations broke down ... after Russia failed to grant U.S. contractors blanket immunity
from legal claims if something were to go awry during an NCI project."); Fioril, Legal Issues,
supra note 17 (indicating that the sole reason for the United States' nonrenewal of the NCI
Agreement in 2003 was Russia's refusal to adopt new liability provisions that mirror those
of the Umbrella Agreement); Fiorill, Liability Dispute, supra note 17 (same).
80. Press Release, Dep't of Energy, Secretary Abraham Proposes Continuing Defense
Conversion Projects in Russian Closed Cities (July 22, 2003), http://www.ransac.orgt
Official%20Documents/U.S.%20GovernmentDepartment%20of3 /o20Energy/724200322443
PM.html; see also supra note 79. For a discussion of the reasons that the United States seeks
stronger liability protections, see infra Part II.C.
81. See Bernier, supra note 76, at 92; Fiorill, Liability Dispute, supra note 17 (noting
Russian Ambassador At-Large Anatoly Antonov's concern with the United States' insistence
on imposing liability on Russia, even in the event of a terrorist strike at a Russian nuclear
facility). For a discussion of the reasons that Russia seeks to limit liability protections in the
case of premeditated acts, see infra Part II.D.
82. Bernier, supra note 76, at 92; Fiorill, Liability Dispute, supra note 17.
83. Bernier, supra note 76, at 92 ("[No new [NCI] efforts can begin before a replacement
agreement is reached."); Webster, supra note 79, at 207; Fiorill, Liability Dispute, supra note
17 ("No new projects envisioned by the initiative will begin, though, and U.S. officials
expressed concern that the liability dispute could drag on....").
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support for nonproliferation efforts that will undermine current and
future CTR projects.'
D. U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Agreements and
Mixed-Oxide Fuel
Recognizing a need to eliminate the significant stocks of surplus
weapons-grade plutonium that existed in both the United States
and Russia after the Cold War, U.S. President Bill Clinton and
Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed in a series of 1998 joint
statements to negotiate a specific and binding international
agreement compelling each country to dispose of fifty tons of
weapons-grade plutonium. 5 The result of this call for action is the
1998 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Russian Federation on
Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Management of
Plutonium that Has Been Withdrawn from Nuclear Military
Programs (PSTA)."6 The PSTA compels both parties to research
plutonium disposition options cooperatively by conducting feasibility
studies to determine how to proceed. 7
84. Press Release, Russian Am. Nuclear Sec. Advisory Council, Terminating
Nonproliferation Agreements with Russia: Dangerous and Unnecessary (July 22, 2003),
http://www.ransac.org/724200325434PM.html (noting the negative implications of the
expiration of the NCI agreement on future CTR projects); Letter from Ike Skelton, John
Spratt, Adam Schiff, Ellen Tauscher, Chet Edwards, and Brad Sherman, U.S.
Representatives, to George W. Bush, President of the United States (July 22,2003), available
at http://www.house.gov/spratt/newsroom/03_04/us_russia~agreements_letter.pdf (arguing
that "[t]his [liability] impasse has placed prospects for future U.S.-Russian nonproliferation
cooperation at great risk" and urging the President "not to adopt a position so rigid as to
produce such a result"). Other CTR efforts that may be negatively affected by the liability
dispute include programs designed to address the following: "chemical weapon destruction;
some biological threat reduction work; fissile material protection, control, and accounting;
nuclear warhead security; and the completion of strategic delivery vehicle elimination."
Luongo & Hoehn, supra note 11, at 30.
85. See Bunn, supra note 21 (tracing the history of U.S.-Russian plutonium disposition
efforts).
86. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Russian Federation on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the
Management of Plutonium that Has Been Withdrawn from Nuclear Military Programs, U.S.-
Russ., July 24, 1998,37 I.L.M. 1296 [hereinafter PSTA], available at http://nti.orgdb/nisprofs/
russia/fulltext/plutdisp/98Ag.htm.
87. Id. art. 3; see Bunn, supra note 21 (discussing generally U.S.-Russian plutonium
disposition efforts).
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Pursuant to PSTA's mandate, the United States and Russia
agreed on a specific course of action in the 2000 Agreement
Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management
and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required
for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation (PMDA)." The
PMDA requires both parties to cooperate to dispose of no less than
thirty-four metric tons of plutonium each, in parallel with one
another, by immobilization or irradiation as nuclear reactor fuel. 9
Immobilization entails blending plutonium with high-level wastes
and vitrifying the resulting composite for burial or storage in a
geologic repository."° Irradiation entails blending plutonium with
uranium to fabricate mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel that can be burned to
produce energy in existing nuclear power plants." The ultimate goal
88. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of
Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation,
U.S.-Russ., Sept. 1, 2000 [hereinafter PMDA], http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/docs/2000_
Agreement.pdf.
89. Id. art. II, para. 1; id. art. III, para. 1. See generally James M. McCormick & Daniel
B. Bullen, Disposing of the World's Excess Plutonium, 26 POL'Y STUD. J. 682, 693-96 (1998)
(describing immobilization and irradiation as the two options that are available to dispose of
surplus plutonium stockpiles).
90. See, e.g., McCormick & Bullen, supra note 89, at 693-94 (discussing the immobilization
option); Bunn, supra note 21 (same). Some scholars and nuclear scientists have questioned
the nonproliferation value of immobilization. See McCormick & Bullen, supra note 90, at 694
("The [vitrified] plutonium in the borosiicate logs could be leeched out of them relatively
easily and could be diverted to weapons use."); Richard Rhodes & Denis Belier, The Need for
Nuclear Power, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 30, 41 (arguing that immobilization may
pose a proliferation threat). But see Luther J. Carter & Thomas H. Pigford, Confronting the
Paradox in Plutonium Policies, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Winter 1999-2000, at 29, 29-36
(articulating the nonproliferation benefits of the immobilization option compared to the MOX
approach); Paul Leventhal & Steven Dolley, The MOX and Vitrification Options Compared:
A Non-Proliferation Perspective, NUCLEAR CONTROL INST., 1995, http://www.nci.org/b/
berlin.htm (same).
91. See, e.g., McCormick & Bullen, supra note 89, at 695-96 (discussing the MOX option);
Bunn, supra note 21 (same). Like the irradiation option, the MOX option has been heavily
criticized as potentially increasing the risk of nuclear proliferation for a number of reasons.
Paul Leventhal and Steven Dolley of the Nuclear Control Institute argue that the MOX option
poses a serious proliferation risk for several reasons: (1) plutonium can be easily diverted or
stolen during transportation between the MOX fabrication site and the reactor or during the
fuel fabrication process; (2) legitimizing a plutonium-based fuel cycle will encourage other
nations to begin using plutonium for energy, which undermines the nonproliferation regime;
(3) it is easy to reverse the irradiation process and extract weapons-grade plutonium from
fabricated MOX fuel; and (4) even reactor-grade MOX can be used for constructing nuclear
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of the PMDA is a reduction by two metric tons per year of each
country's surplus weapons-grade plutonium, beginning no later than
2008.92
The immobilization option was met with hostility in Russia,
where surplus weapons-grade plutonium is viewed as an economic
resource that should be exploited to produce cheap energy.93
Although the United States initially took the position that some
plutonium should be irradiated and some should be immobilized,
Russia rejected this option, and the current Bush administration
has acquiesced to Russia's demand that both parties' plutonium be
fabricated into MOX and burned in reactors.94 Russia currently has
several nuclear reactors that are capable of burning MOX fuel, but
they have no facilities for fabricating MOX. 95 Pursuant to the
PMDA, Russia planned to construct a MOX fabrication plant in
2004 with assistance from the United States.96 A number of U.S.
weapons. Leventhal & Dolley, supra note 90; see also Carter & Pigford, supra note 90, at 29-
36; Paul Leventhal & Steven Dolley, The Plutonium Fallacy: An Update, NONPROLIFERATION
REV., Spring-Summer 1999, at 75, 76-77, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/voO6/63/
leven63.pdf; Steven Dolley, Ploughshares or Swords? Why the MOX Approach to Plutonium
Disposition Is Bad for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, NUCLEAR CONTROL INST., Mar. 28,
1997, httpJ/www.nci.org/i/ib32897a.htm. But see Rhodes & Belier, supra note 90, at 42
(arguing that converting plutonium into MOX fuel for reactors will prevent covert
proliferation); Position Statement, Am. Nuclear Soc'y, Disposition of Surplus Weapons
Plutonium Using Mixed Oxide Fuel (Nov. 2002), available at http://www.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/
ps47.pdf (identifying the nonproliferation benefits of the MOX option); Press Release, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, NRC To Hold Public Meetings to Discuss Draft Environmental
Impact Statement on Proposed MOX Nuclear Facility (Mar. 12, 2003), http://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-colections/news/2003/03-029.pdf ("Converting weapons-grade plutonium into
MOX fuel helps advance the cause of nonproliferation by converting the material into a form
unsuitable for use in weapons of mass destruction.").
92. PMDA, supra note 88, art. IV, paras. 1-2; see also Bunn, supra note 21 (discussing the
provisions of the PMDA).
93. See, e.g., MATTHEW BuNN, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTL PEACE & HARVARD UNIV.,
THE NEXT WAVE: URGENTLY NEEDED NEW STEPS TO CONTROL WARHEADS AND FISSILE
MATERIAL 58-59 (2000), available at http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/
FullNextWave.pdf (articulating the reasons for Russia's preference for disposing surplus
weapons-grade plutonium by irradiating it for use as reactor fuel).
94. Bunn, supra note 21.
95. Id. ("[Tihe planned approach was to burn Russia's excess weapons plutonium as MOX
fuel in Russia's VVER-1000 reactors ... and possibly also in Russia's BN-600 fast-neutron
reactor.... [F]abricat[ing] the resulting oxide into fuel ... will require the construction of a new
MOX fabrication plant.").
96. Id. Although the construction of Russia's MOX fabrication plant was slated to begin
in 2004, construction has been delayed as a result of a liability dispute. See infra notes 104-08
and accompanying text; see also Daniel Horner, Date for Building Start of MOX Plant in
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contractors and government personnel have been enlisted to help
Russia construct this MOX plant and to implement precautions for
safely burning MOX in their existing reactors.9 v
Both the PSTA and the PMDA are DOE initiatives, and accord-
ingly, they do not automatically fall under the liability provisions of
the Umbrella Agreement.9" The 1998 PSTA contains liability
language that is virtually identical to that of the NCI; Russia
exempts the United States and any U.S. contractors from liability
for accidents that are not premeditated,99 as well as agrees to
indemnify the United States and U.S contractors against third-
party claims that arise from unintentional conduct.1" The PSTA
Russia Seen Slipping to 2005, NUCLEAR FUEL, Oct. 27, 2003, at 5, 5.
97. See Bunn, supra note 21.
98. See Bernier, supra note 76, at 92 (noting that the terms of the Umbrella Agreement
do not apply to non-DOD CTR projects absent Russian consent); Digges, supra note 23 (noting
that the PSTA and the PMDA are DOE programs that do not fall under the Umbrella
Agreement); see also supra note 11.
99. The PSTA provides that,
[wlith the exception of claims for damage or injury against individuals arising
from theirpremeditated actions, the Government of the Russian Federation shall
bring no claims or other legal proceedings against the Government of the United
States of America and its personnel or its contractors, sub-contractors,
consultants, suppliers or subsuppliers of equipment or services at any tier and
their personnel, in any court or forum, for any damage, including indirect, direct
or consequential damage, arising from activities undertaken pursuant to this
Agreement, to property owned by the Russian Federation. This paragraph shall
not apply to legal actions brought by the Government of the Russian Federation
to enforce the provisions of contracts to which it or a Russian national or other
legal entity is a party.
PSTA, supra note 86, art. 9, para. 1 (emphasis added).
100. Regarding third-party claims, the PSTA provides that,
[wfith the exception of claims for damage or injury against individuals arising
from their premeditated actions, the Government of the Russian Federation shall
provide for the adequate defense of, shall indemnify, and shall bring no claims
or other legal proceedings against, the Government of the United States of
America and its personnel or its contractors, sub-contractors, consultants,
suppliers or subsuppliers of equipment or services at any tier and their
personnel, in connection with third-party claims, in any court or forum, for any
injury or damage, including indirect, direct or consequential injury or damage,
arising from activities undertaken pursuant to this Agreement, occurring within
or outside the territory of the Russian Federation. Nothing in this paragraph
shall be construed as acknowledging the jurisdiction of any court or forum over
third-party claims to which this paragraph applies, nor shall it be construed as
waiving the sovereign immunity of either party with respect to third-party
claims that may be brought against it.
Id. art. 9, para. 2 (emphasis added).
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expired in 2003, just as the NCI did, and it is unlikely to be renewed
for similar reasons.'' Moreover, the PSTA governed only coopera-
tive research on plutonium disposition options, and both countries
agreed that a more specific liability agreement would be necessary
for the PMDA.102
Unfortunately, serious disagreements about which party should
bear the costs of an accident involving construction of a MOX fuel
fabrication facility in Russia or the consumption of MOX fuel in
Russian reactors made it impossible to reach a compromise on
liability language during the PMDA negotiations.' Accordingly, the
PMDA only authorizes the completion of preparatory work for the
construction of a MOX fabrication plant while a subsequent liability
protocol is negotiated.10' The planned liability protocol has yet to be
negotiated, however, and no agreement seems likely in the near
future.105 The risks of constructing and operating nuclear plants,
especially those that involve MOX fuel, are very significant."°
Accordingly, the odds of a serious incident that gives rise to liability
101. Peter Slevin, U.S.-Russia Plutonium Disposition Project Languishing, WASH. POST,
May 10, 2004, at A17; Digges, supra note 23; Fiorill, Legal Issues, supra note 17; Fiorill,
Liability Dispute, supra note 17.
102. Matthew Bunn discusses the scope of the PSTA:
The 1998 agreement included liability provisions which DOE and its contractors
had judged to be adequate for the modest scale joint research and development
activities covered under the agreement.... To actually build and operate major
plutonium-handling facilities, and use plutonium fuel in reactors, would require
a stronger agreement on liability than is included in the 1998 agreement, which
focuses only on research and development.
Bunn, supra note 21.
103. Id.
104. PMDA, supra note 88, Annex on Assistance, sec. II (requiring the United States and
Russia to continue negotiating liability provisions to govern PMDA activities and limiting the
parties' actions under the PMDA to "pre-construction design work" until such liability
provisions are negotiated and enter into force).
105. Bunn, supra note 21 (noting the lack of flexibility that both the United States and
Russia have shown in attempting to negotiate the liability protocol).
106. Edwin S. Lyman, The Safety Risks of Using Mixed-Oxide Fuel in VVER.1000 Reactors:
An Overview, NUCLEAR CONTROL INST., May 20, 2000, http://www.nci.orgle/el-russiamox.htm
(indicating that the use of MOX fuel in Russia's existing reactors, without safety upgrades,
could increase the risk of accidents and meltdowns by limiting the effectiveness of the coolant
mechanisms and reducing the delayed neutron fraction). Moreover, a meltdown at a nuclear
plant that is burning MOX fuel would result in a greater number of deaths than would result
from a meltdown at a plant that is burning conventional nuclear fuel because MOX fuel
contains a high concentration of actinides, increasing the potency of radiation that is released.
Id.
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occurring pursuant to the PMDA are greater than in some other
nonproliferation contexts, and the hurdles to negotiation of mutu-
ally acceptable liability provisions are therefore much higher. It has
now "become clear that Russia is absolutely unwilling" to negotiate
any exemptions for damages caused by intentional conduct, and the
United States will not accept any degree of protection for itself and
its contractors that is weaker than the protection granted in the
Umbrella Agreement. °7
The expiration of the 1998 PSTA and the unlikely conclusion of
a liability protocol pursuant to the 2000 PMDA will result in
plutonium disposition activities grinding to a halt.0 ' Given the
small amount of weapons-grade plutonium that is necessary to
construct a nuclear weapon and the inadequate security measures
employed at Russian storage installations,109 plutonium disposition
is one of the best methods of reducing the risk of terrorists acquiring
material that could be used to construct a nuclear device. 1 0
II. THE CURRENT LIABILITY CONTROVERSY: THE NEED FOR A
NEW APPROACH
A. The Problem of Establishing Liability Provisions for Bilateral
Nonproliferation Agreements
There are a number of issues that make negotiating liability
provisions that govern bilateral nonproliferation assistance
programs extremely difficult. The sheer number of parties with
diverse interests who all seek some degree of protection for them-
selves makes it quite onerous to craft liability provisions that are
satisfactory to all parties involved. In addition, the magnitude and
107. Bunn, supra note 21; see also Bernier, supra note 76, at 92; Fiorill, Liability Dispute,
supra note 17. For a thorough discussion of the positions of the United States and Russia, see
infra Part II.C-D.
108. Bunn, supra note 21 (discussing the liability hurdles that are delaying progress on
cooperative plutonium disposition projects); see also Slevin, supra note 101 (indicating that
the liability dispute is the primary stumbling block that is preventing progress on cooperative
plutonium disposition).
109. See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
110. See Rhodes & Beller, supra note 90, at 42 (arguing that converting plutonium into
MOX fuel for reactors will prevent covert proliferation); Position Statement, Am. Nuclear
Soc'y, supra note 91 (identifying the nonproliferation benefits of plutonium disposition); Press
Release, Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, supra note 91 (same).
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risk of nuclear incidents"1 raise the stakes for all parties because
the potential injuries and damage claims that could result from
incidents occurring pursuant to nonproliferation activities are very
significant.
1. Interested Parties
Given the extent of damage that would arise in the event of a
nuclear incident that occurred pursuant to the implementation of
nonproliferation activities," 2 many parties have strong and diverse
interests in the liability provisions that govern CTR projects. The
victims of nuclear accidents are primarily interested in litigation
procedures that make recovery quick and simple, "including those
that clarify the appropriate jurisdiction[,] ... designate the proper
defendant, and establish the relevant standard of care.""' It is also
critical that the liability scheme ensures that all victims of a nuclear
accident will be fully compensated for any damage caused by such
an accident." 4 Tort law in both the United States and Russia is
based on the general principle that it is socially beneficial to induce
responsibility by shifting the full cost of any damage or injury to the
party that causes the harm, so as to compensate all innocent victims
fully. 15
111. For the purposes of this Note, the term "nuclear incidents" is used to refer to the wide
range of damage-causing events-including those that are caused by negligence-that could
occur pursuant to the implementation of CTR projects. Examples include intentional or
accidental detonations of nuclear weapons, meltdowns or other accidents at nuclear power
plants, terrorist attacks against nuclear plants or storage facilities, nuclear transportation
accidents, and nuclear waste spills. See NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION CAMPAIGN, Liability
Issues in WMD Threat-Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs in Russia, in WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION REFERENCE GUIDE ch. II, pt. 18 at 2, http://www.nuclearthreatreduction.
orglrelatives/22321.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) (identifying a number of potential events
that could cause nuclear damage); Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 6-7 (same).
112. See infra Part II.A.2.
113. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 5.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 14-20 (2d
ed. 2002) (identifying corrective justice, deterrence, loss distribution, compensation, and
redress of social grievances as the interrelated goals that U.S. tort law seeks to accomplish);
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OFTORTS 7-11 (4th ed. 1971) (indicating that the primary functions
of tort law in the United States are compensation for the victim from the party responsible
for causing damage and the encouragement of socially responsible behavior); GENNADY M.
DANILENKO & WILLIAM BURNHAM, LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 343-
45 (1999) (articulating the general principles of Russian tort law, including holding those who
1452 [Vol. 47:1427
2006] NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
The Russian government has a strong interest in receiving
nonproliferation assistance to reduce the nascent nuclear threat
that is emerging because of the defunct state of its nuclear infra-
structure and custodial system.116 On the other hand, Russia has an
interest in avoiding exposure to significant liability for incidents
that are caused by contractors from foreign nations, whose actions
the Russian government cannot control.117 Because the victims of a
nuclear incident involving the implementation of nonproliferation
agreements are likely to be Russian citizens, Russia shares the
interest that the victims of nuclear accidents have in ensuring that
they are compensated to the full extent of their injuries. 8 The
operators of Russian nuclear facilities are generally agents of the
government, or at the very least, they operate under the authority
of Minatom, and accordingly, their interests overlap with those of
the Russian government.1 19
Nations that provide nonproliferation assistance to Russia are
primarily interested in reducing the risks that result from
Russia's crumbling nuclear infrastructure, including transboundary
environmental damage arising from accidents and "dangers that
might emerge from the leakage of Russian fissile material to third
parties."'2 ° On the other hand, donor states have an incredibly
strong interest in avoiding extensive liability for the significant
damages that might result from implementation of nonproliferation
assistance programs. If nonproliferation assistance creates donor
state liability, these states may choose to end their assistance
programs because they are unlikely to bear the costs of most nuclear
cause injury responsible for fully compensating the victims). For further discussion of Russian
tort law, see infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
116. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 5 (noting that Russia acknowledges the various
post-Soviet nuclear threats that are emerging and seeks to address the problem). For a
detailed discussion of the threats to international security that have emerged in Russia
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, see supra Part I.A.
117. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 5-6. The position that Russia has taken recently
concerning the provisions of international nonproliferation assistance agreements that will
govern foreign contractor liability reflects this interest. See infra Part II.D.
118. See Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 5-6; see also supra text accompanying notes
115-16.
119. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 6.
120. Id. at 4-5. For a detailed discussion of the threat of nuclear leakage that has emerged
in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union, see supra Part I.A.
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incidents that would occur in the absence of such programs. 121
Of course, donor nations share the interest of victims in full
compensation, at least to the extent that their citizens may be
harmed as the result of nuclear incidents. 122 Donor state equipment
suppliers and contractors are primarily interested in profiting from
nonproliferation assistance programs, and thus, they seek to avoid
potential liability that could require them to pay damages that
would far exceed their profits.12' Because of the significant risks that
accompany nuclear projects, suppliers and contractors have sought
extremely strong assurances that Russia or the donor state would
indemnify them in the event of an incident.1 24
2. The Impact and Likelihood of Nuclear Incidents
The magnitude of the damage caused by a nuclear incident can be
very extensive. A meltdown like the one that occurred at Chernobyl
on April 26, 1986, could result in hundreds of thousands of deaths
and cause damages in excess of several hundred billion dollars.'25
121. For example, in the absence of providing assistance to Russia, a nation such as the
United States and its citizens may suffer only several million dollars of uncompensated
damage if a nuclear meltdown were to occur in Russia. On the other hand, if the United
States provided assistance to Russia for nuclear plant safety upgrades and the same nuclear
plant were to meltdown, the United States may be liable for several billion dollars of
damage--enough to compensate all of the victims of the meltdown. Brubaker & Spector, supra
note 18, at 5 ("In the absence of providing safety assistance for Russian nuclear power plants,
for example, the United States might risk suffering $50 million in uncompensated
contamination damage to U.S. territory from a Russian nuclear power plant accident."); see
also infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
122. See Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 5 ("[D]onor governments also have an
interest in assured compensation if their citizens, economy, or environment suffer nuclear
damage because of Russian nuclear activities that may be receiving assistance."); see also
supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
123. Brubaker and Spector summarize the economic cost-benefit analysis facing donor state
equipment suppliers and contractors:
Private-entity equipment suppliers and contractors are beneficiaries of nuclear
assistance programs through the profits they make in providing goods and
services to support such efforts. However, because nuclear activities are
inherently dangerous and carry the potential for liability that far exceeds
potential profits, vendors have sought special legal assurances ... that protect
them from these legal risks.
Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 5.
124. See supra note 124.
125. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 1 (citing an OECD study that estimated the
damages of a nuclear meltdown at $100 billion); Kate O'Neill & William C.G. Burns, Nuclear
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Beyond the short-term loss of human life and damage to property,
there are long-term costs related to environmental damage that
accompany the release of radiation and dispersal of nuclear material
in a nuclear incident.'26 Even minor incidents that fall short of
a full-scale meltdown are likely to cause damages in excess of
several hundred million dollars. 127 Activities involving plutonium
are particularly risky given the potency of the substance,'28 and the
risk and impact of reactor meltdowns may significantly increase
when MOX is used as the reactor fuel. 129 Moreover, nuclear
incidents may be very likely to occur in the CTR context. Given the
deterioration of Russia's nuclear security infrastructure over the
past decade, there is a significant risk of a terrorist attack at a
Russian nuclear facility or detonation of a nuclear device that was
constructed with stolen Russian fissile material because of inade-
quate security measures and the lack of funding for upkeep of
nuclear plants and storage facilities. l 0 The damages that would
arise from such an act of nuclear terrorism would be enormous. 1
31
Accordingly, the stakes are high for all interested parties during the
negotiation of the liability provisions that will govern how and by
whom multi-billion dollar damage claims will be paid in the event
that a catastrophic incident occurs pursuant to the implementation
of a CTR project.3 2
Power Comes Out Swinging, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 16,2001, at B7 (indicating that an
accident like the meltdown at Chernobyl could cause more than $250 billion in damages and
kill more than 10,000 people).
126. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 1.
127. Id. (indicating that damage claims from nuclear waste spills or transportation
accidents could run as high as hundreds of millions of dollars).
128. See Lyman, supra note 106 (articulating the unique danger of an accident involving
plutonium because of the heightened actinide concentration in fuel containing the substance);
see also Helen Caldicott, Medical Implications of Nuclear Power, SUSTAINABLE CITY, Sept. 3,
1998, http://www.sustainable-city.org/articles/nuclear.htm ("Because of its potent cancer
producing properties the acceptable body dose [of plutonium] has been set at less than 1
millionth of a gram .... [One] lb. of plutonium, universally dispersed, would be adequate to kill
every man, woman and child on earth.").
129. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
132. See Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 6-7. The current liability dispute would be
much more "easily resolved if only a few million dollars were at risk, rather than many
billions." Id. at 6. Moreover,
lliability for damages arising from mishaps involving nuclear and other WMD
and materials can be an enormous issue. Any organization or business will
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B. Applicable Law Absent an Agreement on Liability
Absent explicit liability provisions that govern which party or
parties will be liable in the event of a nuclear incident that occurs
during implementation of a nonproliferation assistance program,
and to what extent they would be liable, it is uncertain what law
would provide the answer. "[U]nder traditional tort [and customary
international law], injured parties could bring a lawsuit against any
party that was involved in the activity that led to the injury," and
"[t]he suit could be brought in any court with jurisdiction over the
party being sued."'33 Conflict of laws rules of the state in which the
suit was brought would dictate which state's domestic laws would
apply.' Given that most victims of a nuclear incident that occurs
pursuant to the implementation of nonproliferation projects in
Russia will be Russian citizens, it is likely that suits for damages
would be brought in Russian courts and that jurisdiction would be
proper.13 5 In the case of a suit that is brought in Russian courts, the
understandably be reluctant to run any risk at all of being held liable when a
Chernobyl-type incident [or] the detonation of a nuclear device ... occurs in a
manner that can in any way be connected to its activity.... The resulting claims
obviously could put any private firm out of business and be a major, if not
overwhelming, burden for any country.
It is these types of calamitous incidents ... that make this such a high-stakes
concern.
NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION CAMPAIGN, supra note 111, ch. II, pt. 18 at 2. It is important to
note, however, that some CTR projects are significantly less risky than others, which may
make the negotiation of mutually acceptable liability provisions simpler in those cases. See
infra notes 269-71 and accompanying text.
133. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 9.
134. Id.
135. Because the victims of nuclear incidents seek quick and simple resolution of their
claims, it seems logical that the many Russian victims would bring suit in Russian courts and
not foreign courts. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. The jurisdiction of Russian
courts over tort claims brought by Russian citizens against foreign contractors is proper under
Russian domestic law.
[J]urisdiction depends on the presence of the defendant or his or her property in
Russia....
The Civil Procedure Code establishes several additional criteria that could be
used by the Russian courts as grounds for asserting wider jurisdiction over
defendants located in other countries. These are based on the fact that the
dispute has some connection to the territory of Russia.... [Sluits resulting from
... torts may be filed at the place ... where harm was caused.
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conflict of laws provisions of the Russian Civil Code indicate that
Russian tort law would provide the applicable standards, absent an
international agreement that provides otherwise.'
Russian principles of tort liability are outlined in the Russian
Civil Code, which provides that an individual who is harmed by the
act or omission of another is to be compensated for economic and
noneconomic losses.117 A defendant who is not at fault may still be
held liable under a theory of strict liability for engaging in conduct
that is inherently risky and that poses a serious threat to the
environment.'38 Moreover, even if a defendant is insured, the
defendant may be responsible for paying the difference between the
victims' full damages and the insurance coverage.'39 These liability
DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 115, at 413 (describing articles 117 and 118 of Russia's
Civil Procedure Code). Accordingly, Russian courts can properly exercise jurisdiction over
foreign contractors who are present in Russia or whose actions gave rise to harm in Russia,
both of which are likely true for contractors who are involved with CTR activities.
136. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code], art. 1186, translated in THE CIVIL CODE
OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION pt. 3, at 37 (Peter B. Maggs & A.N. Zhiltsov eds. & trans., 2002)
[hereinafter CIVIL CODE]; see also WILLIAM E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAW 616-18 (2d ed. 2003)
(discussing the application of the conflict of laws provisions in the Civil Code of the Russian
Federation and indicating that foreign laws may be applied in Russia if an international
agreement so provides, as per Civil Code article 1186); DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note
115, at 398-410 (discussing Russian conflict of laws rules). Absent an international agreement
that provides otherwise, it is clear that Russian courts would apply Russian tort law.
Danilenko and Burnham describe the Russian domestic conflict of laws provisions concerning
tort claims as providing that
the rights and duties of parties in obligations arising as a consequence of causing
harm are determined according to the law of the country where the action or
other circumstance serving as a basis for an action concerning compensation of
harm took place. This broad clause may cover both the place of the wrong and
the place where the consequences of the wrong are felt.
DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 115, at 408 (describing article 167 of the 1991
Fundamentals of Civil Legislation).
137. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code], art. 1064, translated in CIVIL CODE, supra
note 137, pt. 2, at 361 (prescribing compensation); DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 115,
at 345 (discussing Civil Code article 1064). All of the rules governing tort liability and
compensation in Russia are found in Chapter 59 of the Civil Code. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF
[GK] [Civil Code] ch. 59, translated in CIVIL CODE, supra note 137, pt. 2, at 361-75.
138. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code], art. 1079, translated in CIVIL CODE, supra
note 137, pt. 2, at 366 (prescribing strict liability); DANILENKO & BURNHAM, supra note 115,
at 347-54 (discussing Civil Code article 1079). Nuclear activities probably give rise to strict
liability because they are very risky, and nuclear incidents are likely to cause environmental
harm. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
139. Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK [Civil Code], art. 1072, translated in CIVIL CODE, supra
note 137, pt. 2, at 364.
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provisions of the Russian Civil Code are all very broad and could
expose the defendants in suits related to nonproliferation assistance
programs to open-ended liability and unlimited damage claims.
140
C. The Position of the U.S. Government
The position of the U.S. government regarding the liability
provisions that govern nonproliferation assistance programs-
including the NCI, the PSTA, and the PMDA-reflects the interests
of most donor governments. The United States' position is primarily
characterized by a demand that Russia accept the sweeping liability
provisions of the Umbrella Agreement, or virtually identical
provisions, for all bilateral CTR assistance programs. 141 The United
States points to Russia's acceptance of the Umbrella Agreement for
the initial CTR projects in the early 1990s as evidence that the
standard established therein should be the norm.'42 Specifically, the
United States is seeking language that would absolve it and any
U.S. contractors of liability, even in the event that they intention-
ally cause an incident. 14 The United States also requires that
140. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 2; Ann MacLachlan, Liability Coverage
at Issue in Expiration of U.S.-Russian Accord, NUCLEAR FUEL, July 7,2003, at 3; Fiorill, Legal
Issues, supra note 17; Fiorill, Liability Dispute, supra note 17.
142. See Fiorill, Legal Issues, supra note 17 (quoting Leonard Spector, director of the
Washington office of the Monterey Institute of International Studies at the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, describing the Bush administration's insistence on Russian
acceptance of liability provisions that mirror those of the "tried-and-true" Umbrella
Agreement approach).
143. Matthew Bunn notes that
[the PSTA's liability] provisions did not include language that would absolve the
United States and its contractors of responsibility even if they cause an accident
intentionally, which is included in the [Umbrella Agreement] .... Russia is
absolutely unwilling to again agree to language that would leave the Russian
government liable for intentional sabotage by U.S. contractors, while the U.S.
is unwilling to accept liability language that left the determination of what was
intentional sabotage solely up to Russian courts ....
Bunn, supra note 21; see also MacLachlan, supra note 141, at 3; Small Steps Toward Nuclear
Control, DEF. NEWS, Sept. 19, 2005, at 29 ("The United States insisted on zero liability--even
for damage caused by intentional sabotage by U.S. personnel.'); Joe Fiorill, U.S. Fears
"Manipulation"of Russian Legal System in Joint Nuclear Security Efforts, GLOBAL SECURITY
NEWSWIRE, Jan. 14,2004, httpJ/www.nti.org/tdnewswire/issues/2004_1_14.html [hereinafter
Fiorill, U.S. Fears Manipulation] ("The Russian Federation should provide indemnity against
liability resulting from accidents and problems [that extends to] deliberate acts of
individuals"' (alteration in original) (quoting Linton Brooks, Director, National Nuclear
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Russia indemnify all U.S. contractors against any third-party claims
that are linked to an incident that occurs while nonproliferation
activities are being implemented,144 even though such a provision
may be unenforceable in U.S. courts.
145
The United States' position is premised on three major argu-
ments. First, the United States argues that Russia should shoulder
the burden for virtually any damage caused as a result of imple-
menting projects funded with U.S. assistance because in the absence
of such assistance, Russia would be financially responsible for all
damages arising from incidents occurring in Russian territory.14
For example, if a reactor accident like Chernobyl were to occur in
Russia today, the Russian government or the operators of the plant
would be held responsible for paying damages to both Russian and
non-Russian individuals that were harmed as a result of negligent
maintenance of the reactor. 47 Given that the consequences of a
nuclear incident in Russia could affect the United States or its
interests, 48 and given the lack of capital in Russia to cover exten-
sive damage claims that would result, 49 the United States might
risk suffering some minimal uncompensated damage in the event
of a Russian accident. 50 If U.S. assistance to Russia "exposed the
United States to potential liability for all nuclear damage from such
an accident, its risk could be many billions of dollars, orders of
magnitude more than were no aid provided."' 5' Accordingly, it
makes little sense for the United States to provide assistance to
Security Administration)); Fiorill, Liability Dispute, supra note 17.
144. The original Umbrella Agreement contained third-party indemnification clauses, and
the United States has refused to abandon these provisions. See Brubaker & Spector, supra
note 18, at 19; see also MacLachlan, supra note 141, at 3.
145. See Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 23 (arguing that the Umbrella Agreement's
third-party indemnification clause may be unenforceable in U.S. courts because it "lack[s]
good faith [and was] the product of grossly unequal bargaining power").
146. Id. at 5. The Russian government or Russian citizens would be held liable for incidents
that occur in Russia, such as a nuclear plant meltdown or detonation of a nuclear device, and
for incidents that occur outside of Russia but were facilitated by intentional or negligent
conduct of Russian parties. Id.
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
149. See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
150. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 5 (suggesting that the United States may suffer
some uncompensated harm in the event of an incident in Russia that affected its citizens or
its interests but was not caused by the actions of any U.S. personnel).
151. Id.; see also supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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Russia if doing so would expose the United States to greater liability
than if the assistance were not given.152 In sum, Russia would be
liable for covering damages caused by any nuclear incidents that
occurred in Russian territory, so Russia should also shoulder the
responsibility for paying damages that result from cooperative
efforts to reduce the risk of such incidents.
Second, the United States argues that very broad liability
protections, like those contained in the Umbrella Agreement, are
necessary for the existence of bilateral nonproliferation programs
in the first place. U.S. contractors will not be willing to participate
in nonproliferation programs unless they are exempt from all
liability.15 Given that the sole interest of U.S. contractors is to
profit from participation in nonproliferation activities, lack of
adequate protection from liability makes participation entirely
unattractive because of the significant risk of a nuclear accident
occurring and the massive damage claims that would arise if an
accident did occur.15 The United States' primary interest in
providing nonproliferation assistance to Russia is to reduce the risks
to international security arising from Russia's crumbling nuclear
infrastructure.'55 If weak liability provisions were to sound the
death knell for all nonproliferation programs by providing a
disincentive for contractors and the government to provide aid and
participate, then the United States' primary interest is not served.
Third, the United States argues that even a limited exception to
blanket exemption'56 from suit is improper given the state of the
152. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
153. See Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 5; see also Fiorill, U.S. Fears Manipulation,
supra note 143.
154. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text; infra note 159.
155. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
156. Recently, Russia has opposed blanket liability protections for donor state
governments, suppliers, and equipment contractors, arguing that it should not be required
to waive claims against or indemnify any parties over whom it exercises no control and who
cause damage as the result of premeditated action. See NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION
CAMPAIGN, supra note 111, at 1, 7; Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 5-6; Bunn, supra
note 21; Fiorill, Liability Dispute, supra note 17; FiorilU, U.S. Fears Manipulation, supra note
143. Russia has, however, entered into bilateral and multilateral agreements that include
blanket liability protections, as long as they except premeditated actions from protection. See
supra note 78 (providing the liability provisions of the NCI); supra notes 100-01 (providing the
liability provisions of the PSTA); infra note 216 (providing the liability provisions of the
MNEPR).
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Russian legal system. According to U.S. government officials, the
fledgling Russian legal system that emerged after the collapse of
the Soviet Union is dominated by corruption that could expose any
U.S. personnel or contractors to unfair treatment."7 This perceived
unreliability of the Russian legal system bolsters U.S. contractors'
argument that they will not participate in nonproliferation pro.
grams if they are not given broad exemption from liability.'58 If a
contractor is potentially subject to prosecution in the Russian legal
system, the broadly worded and uncertain laws'5 9 and risk of
"manipulation"' that accompany such a prosecution increase the
risk that the contractor will be exposed to unlimited liability.'
16
Specifically, the U.S. government and U.S. contractors worry about
how the Russian courts will interpret the term "premeditated,"
fearing that an expansive definition of the term will expose them to
significant liability, despite the seemingly limited nature of the
exception. 62 As mentioned above, the interests of the United States
157. Fiorill, U.S. Fears Manipulation, supra note 143 (articulating the position of the U.S.
government that the Russian legal system can be easily manipulated, risking unfair
treatment of U.S. contractors); Sebastian Sprenger, Russian Interagency Review of Liabilities
Deal Expected to End Soon, INSIDE MISSILE DEF., Oct. 26, 2005, available at http://defense.
iwpnewsstand.com/showdoc.asp?docid=MISSILE-11-22-4 ("Washington [is] reluctant to
submit U.S. personnel to the Russian court system, which could lead to 'either political or
economic harassment from either individuals in Russia or the Russian government' .....
(quoting an unnamed State Department source)).
158. Keith J. Costa, Sen. Domenici: U.S., Russia Agree on Liability for Plutonium
Disposition, INSIDE THE PENTAGON, July 21, 2005, available at http://defense.iwpnewsstand.
com/show.asp?docid=PENTAGON-21-29-4 ("Concerns that Russian courts could be pressured
to pass the bill on to U.S. contractors who worked at the scene could scare them off from
participating in nonproliferation activities in Russia."); see also supra notes 154-55, 158 and
accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 138-41 and accompanying text (describing Russia's broadly worded
tort laws).
160. Fiorill, U.S. Fears Manipulation, supra note 143.
161. See Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 10 (indicating that potential liability for
claims against contractors could be open-ended, depending on which laws are applied to
decide the claim); see also NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION CAMPAIGN, supra note 111, ch. II, pt.
18 at 2, 7; Fiorill, U.S. Fears Manipulation, supra note 143.
162. Joe Fiorill of the Nuclear Threat Initiative describes the United States' concern by
citing an unnamed government official:
The key question behind U.S. concerns, according to one U.S. official familiar
with the situation, is, "What's a premeditated act? If something goes wrong, the
Russians can say, 'hat was a premeditated act.' ... The Russians have this
exception, and if something goes wrong - you know, someone could say
Chernobyl was a deliberate act," the official said.
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regarding implementation of nonproliferation agreements are not
served if contractors are unwilling to participate.
The United States' position regarding liability is characterized
by an unwavering demand for broad protection for itself and its
contractors. This policy largely serves the interests of the United
States, reducing the risk of a catastrophic incident occurring
because of Russia's crumbling nuclear infrastructure by providing
an incentive for contractors to participate in implementing
nonproliferation agreements, while limiting liability for itself and
its contractors. 163 By default, the United States' position would leave
Russia liable for compensating any victims who brought damage
claims that resulted from nuclear accidents incidental to
nonproliferation agreements. 164 This outcome may not serve the
United States' interest in ensuring that any U.S. victims of such an
accident are fully compensated for their injuries, unless the United
States compensated its own citizens for any damage suffered
because of Russia's financial inability to pay significant claims. 165
Fiorill, U.S. Fears Manipulation, supra note 143 (omission in original). The Nuclear Threat
Reduction Campaign provides a hypothetical situation that demonstrates the United States'
fear:
There is the concern that a Russian tribunal might, for example, decide that if
a U.S. firm, aware of the risks involved in destroying chemical warfare material,
went ahead with a program for destroying it and an accident occurred or some
of it was stolen, the intentional act of proceeding with the program might be
construed as the premeditated risking of the lives or health of those who might
be injured and hold the company liable. That, of course, would be a grossly
overly broad application of "premeditated" injury, but a corrupt judge might, it
is feared, make such a ruling.
NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION CAMPAIGN, supra note 111, ch. II, pt. 18 at 7.
163. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 4-5.
164. See id. at 22 (discussing what would take place if a nuclear incident occurred under
the CTR Umbrella Agreement, which provides complete liability protection for the United
States and its contractors).
165. Id. at 5, 22-23 (discussing the weak state of Russia's insurance industry and the lack
of available capital to pay claims); see infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text. If Russia
were unable to fully compensate U.S. citizens who were the victims of a nuclear incident that
occurred pursuant to the implementation of CTR activities, the United States could cover any
damage shortfalls for its citizens, and the amount of such claims would only be a fraction of
the total damage caused. See supra notes 121, 147-53 and accompanying text.
1462
2006] NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
D. The Position of the Russian Government
Although the Russian government initially accepted broad
liability provisions exempting the United States and its contractors
from any liability arising from implementation of nonproliferation
activities in the Umbrella Agreement,"' it has recently retreated
from that position. As evidenced by the more limited liability
protections articulated in the NCI and the PSTA, as well as the
language of the recently concluded Multilateral Nuclear Environ-
mental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR),6 7 Russia now
supports indemnifying and exempting donor governments and
personnel from liability in all instances except those in which an
incident is caused by "premeditated actions."' Although the United
States hopes that the Duma will accept the Umbrella Agreement as
the governing document for all bilateral nonproliferation assistance
agreements, the prospect of that is very slim. 69
Russia advances three arguments supporting its position. First,
Russia is unlikely to have the resources to compensate fully the
victims who make a significant claim for damages because of
Russia's limited financial resources. 7 ' The mere fact that Russia
needs international assistance to improve the security of its nuclear
infrastructure indicates the lack of capital that exists to pay
compensation for a nuclear accident in excess of hundreds of
millions of dollars. 7' The lack of capital in Russia's fledgling
insurance markets compounds this problem.'72 Second, Russia is
concerned that providing broad indemnity for equipment suppliers
and contractors that implement nonproliferation agreements may
166. See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
167. Framework Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the
Russian Federation, May 21, 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 155) 37 [hereinafter MNEPR], available at
http://www.sgpproject. org/MNEPRAgreement.pdf. Seeinfra notes 213-20 and accompanying
text.
168. See supra note 156; infra notes 213-20 and accompanying text.
169. See MacLachlan, supra note 141, at 3; Bunn, supra note 21; Fiorill, Legal Issues, supra
note 17; Fiorill, Liability Dispute, supra note 17; NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION CAMPAIGN,
supra note 111, ch. II, pt. 18 at 2-3.
170. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 2, 5.
171. Id. at 2 ("[If Russia possessed the ability to marshal the billions of dollars that might
be needed to pay compensation for a major nuclear accident, it would not need Western
nonproliferation assistance in the first place.").
172. Id. at 22.
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increase the likelihood of a catastrophic incident, as there may
be an incentive, or at least no disincentive, to use lower quality
materials and procedures.17 Third, Russia does not want to assume
liability for damages that are intentionally caused by parties over
which it cannot exercise any control, such as foreign contractors 174
or terrorists.
75
Russia's interests are largely served by its position on liability
issues that govern nonproliferation assistance programs. Russia has
a clear interest in receiving assistance to secure and dispose of its
nuclear material, as well as assistance to consolidate its nuclear
infrastructure, because implementing bilateral nonproliferation
agreements can reduce the risk of catastrophic incidents that would
cause extensive harm to its population. 76 Ensuring that there are
quality control standards that govern the materials and services
of foreign equipment suppliers and contractors is necessary for
effective nonproliferation activities. 177 Russia has a significant
interest in ensuring that there is adequate compensation to cover
fully any claims by the victims of nuclear incidents because they
are likely to be Russian citizens. 7 Russia's policy thus seeks to
balance inducing other nations to provide nonproliferation assis-
tance against avoiding accepting all responsibility for every incident
that may arise pursuant to implementation of nonproliferation
programs and the attendant risks of compensation shortfalls that
would accompany accepting responsibility.
173. Id. at 5 ("Russia may have legitimate concerns that equipment or services provided
by donor states may be defective and lead to incidents causing significant nuclear damage.");
see also Beard, supra note 13, at 918-20 (discussing protections against the use of substandard
equipment and materials in CTR implementing agreements).
174. See supra note 156; see also Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 6 ("It is also
possible that an employee of a Western contractor not under Russian supervision might
deliberately and maliciously act to cause nuclear damage. Under these circumstances, it is
understandable why Russia would resist accepting unconditionally all liability for such
damages.").
175. See Fiorill, Liability Dispute, supra note 17 ("Citing the possibility of an al-Qaeda
strike on a Russian nuclear facility, [Russian Ambassador At-Large] Antonov criticized the
United States for seeking to make Russia liable for the results of premeditated acts.").
176. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. To ensure that foreign contractors are
willing to participate in CTR activities, they must have assurances that they will be protected
from extensive liability. See Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 5; see also Fiorill, U.S.
Fears Manipulation, supra note 143; supra notes 124-25, 154-55 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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III. THE PATH FORWARD: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE
LIABILITY IMPASSE
Given the interests of both the United States and Russia, 179
neither country is likely to simply adopt the other's position
regarding liability provisions for nonproliferation assistance
programs. The fact that agreements such as the NCI and the PSTA,
both of which the United States and Russia have acknowledged to
be worthwhile programs, have been allowed to expire because of
liability disputes is indicative of the importance to both countries of
promulgating liability provisions that adequately protect their
interests. 1"c Both countries have reasonable arguments supporting
their positions,181 and it seems that the impasse will only be
resolved if a new approach is taken that looks to creative solutions
that bridge the gap between the countries' positions, effectively
protecting both states' interests to a significant degree.'82
A. Application of Existing Civilian Nuclear Power
Liability Agreements
An extensive body of international law covers liability issues
regarding civilian nuclear power accidents that have transboundary
effects. 1" In the event that an accident occurs, operators of nuclear
179. See supra Part II.A.1.
180. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the high stakes involved in negotiating liability
provisions to govern CTR activities).
181. See supra Part II.C-D (discussing the arguments advanced by both parties in support
of their respective positions).
182. Matthew Bunn notes that
if there is to be any way out, it will likely have to involve some process that both
sides can agree on relating to how to determine whether intentional sabotage
was the cause of an accident, or some means to address liability in that case
without either the Russian government nor [sic] the U.S. government picking up
the entire tab.
Bunn, supra note 21; see also Fiorill, Liability Dispute, supra note 17 (quoting Rose
Gottemoeller of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as saying that there is "good
reason to be looking at some new and innovative approaches to tackling the liability
problem"). See generally Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18 (arguing for a new approach to
negotiating liability provisions that will govern CTR activities).
183. For an in-depth discussion of the entire legal regime that governs liability for civilian
nuclear accidents, see Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 11-17. See generally Karen
McMillan, Note, Strengthening the International Legal Framework for Nuclear Energy, 13
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facilities are held strictly liable for any damages arising from
accidents at their facilities, although there are procedural and
substantive limits on claims that may be brought, including statutes
of limitations, liability limits, and jurisdictional requirements."
The international legal framework governing liability for civilian
nuclear power accidents also prescribes pooling agreements and
minimum levels of insurance coverage that operators of nuclear
facilities must purchase," and nations that are parties to these
agreements are required to incorporate the insurance provisions
into their domestic laws." This legal regime may offer some
assistance in dealing with liability concerns that surround imple-
mentation of bilateral nonproliferation assistance agreements.
8 7
The international civilian nuclear power liability regime's
minimum insurance requirements may shed some light on the
costliness of nuclear accidents and on how much compensation
states ought to be expected to provide if a serious accident occurs.'
The regime also indicates that pooling agreements may be a viable
method for providing full compensation to all victims of serious
nuclear accidents. 89
Moreover, the body of international law that governs civilian
nuclear accidents with transboundary effects is already well
developed, and given the nature of radiation spread resulting from
GEO. INTL ENVTL. L. REv. 983 (2001) (surveying critically the international legal regime that
governs civilian nuclear power and providing recommendations for strengthening the regime
to improve its effectiveness).
184. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 11 (articulating the general principles of
liability that govern operation of civilian nuclear power plants).
185. The 1963 Vienna Convention requires the operators of civilian nuclear power plants
to hold at least $80 million in accident insurance coverage, or the state where the plant is
located must make up the difference. Id. at 12. The 1997 protocol to the Vienna Convention
raises this figure to $400 million, "but it has not yet entered into force." Id. at 13.
186. Id. at 13-14.
187. Id. at 17 (noting that the international civilian nuclear power liability regime provides
guidance regarding what levels of liability a state engaging in nuclear activities can
reasonably be expected to bear).
188. Id. (arguing that "(t]he evolving consensus, seen in the 1997 Vienna Protocol ...
appears to be that following a major nuclear incident, a state ... can be expected to take
financial responsibility for $400 million or more of such claims").
189. See id. (indicating that states can reasonably expect pooling agreements to cover any
damage claims arising from a nuclear accident in excess of the $400 million required
minimum insurance coverage).
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a nuclear accident, any accident is likely to have some
transboundary effects."9 Accordingly, any accidents that occur at
civilian nuclear facilities may fall under the provisions of this
regime, although compensation is only available to states that are
parties to the treaties that constitute the regime.191 The utility of
this international civilian nuclear power liability regime may be
limited, therefore, because many states, including the major nuclear
power states, have not ratified most of the international legal
documents that constitute the regime. 192 Most states have, however,
adopted some form of domestic legal provisions that would provide
compensation to all victims in the event of a nuclear reactor
accident in their respective state.
193
In March 2005, Russia ratified the 1963 Vienna Convention,
which is the seminal document in the international civilian nuclear
power liability regime.' 94 Unfortunately, Russia's ratification does
not provide much assistance in resolving the liability dispute that
currently exists between the United States and Russia concerning
nonproliferation assistance programs. First, the Duma must still
pass domestic laws both incorporating the provisions of the Vienna
Convention and specifying coverage levels for various activities
before its provisions will go into effect. 95 Second, the Vienna
Convention only covers civilian activities, and most of the non-
proliferation work involves military facilities. 196 Third, the required
190. Id. at 4-5 (noting that the spread of radiation following a nuclear incident in Russia
would likely affect neighboring states).
191. Id. at 15-16.
192. Id. at 16 (indicating that the United States, Canada, China, South Korea, and Japan
have not ratified the treaties that constitute the civilian nuclear power liability regime).
193. Id.
194. Alexei Breus & Ann MacLachlan, Vienna Convention Ratification by Russia Called
Timid First Step, NUCLEONICS WK., Mar. 17, 2005, at 6 (noting that the Federation Council
endorsed ratification of the Vienna Convention on March 11, 2005, and the State Duma
endorsed ratification on March 3, 2005); Putin Ratifies Civil Liability Convention, NUCLEAR
NEWS, May 2005, at 47 (indicating that President Putin signed a bill ratifying the Vienna
Convention on March 22, 2005).
195. Breus & MacLachan, supra note 194, at 6.
196. See Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 16. The plutonium disposition projects
contemplate the elimination of Russian surplus military-origin, weapons-grade plutonium by
fabricating plutonium with classified characteristics into MOX fuel to be burned as fuel in
civilian nuclear power plants. See id. at 7; Bunn, supra note 21. Accordingly, these programs
have both civilian and military components. Similarly, the NCI focuses on downsizing the
Russian military's nuclear weapons complex by providing nonmilitary employment
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minimum liability limits mandated by the Vienna Convention are
too low to adequately compensate victims in the event of a serious
civilian accident of the kind that is likely to occur pursuant to a
nonproliferation assistance program.197 As such, the existing
international legal regime that governs liability for civilian nuclear
power accidents provides only minimal insight into how to deal with
the liability concerns that surround implementation of bilateral
nonproliferation projects.
B. The European Experience
The United States has been the primary donor of nonproliferation
assistance to Russia, but other nations have also recognized the
threat of Russia's crumbling nuclear infrastructure and have sought
to conclude agreements that offer assistance to deal with those
problems.19 The experience of European nations is indicative of the
types of liability provisions that are acceptable to Russia, and
accordingly, that experience may provide insight into the types of
agreements that could break the current liability impasse that
exists between the United States and Russia. Occasionally, liability
disputes have arisen during the negotiation of Russia's agreements
with European nations, but they have generally impeded progress
much less than during bilateral U.S.-Russian negotiations.'99
The 1995 European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
Agreement (EBRD Agreement) between several European nations
and Russia governs assistance from those nations to Russia for the
improvement of civilian nuclear plant safety. °° In the EBRD
opportunities to former Russian military nuclear scientists. See Bunn, supra note 20.
197. Breus & MacLachlan, supra note 194, at 6 (noting that Russia's ratification of the
Vienna Convention is merely symbolic because the liability limits are too low to provide
adequate compensation for victims and because contractors will still be wary of engaging in
risky activities in Russia); Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 16 ('The minimum limits
of liability and financial protection required by the Vienna Convention are far too low to
provide adequate compensation for the more serious civilian nuclear incidents that could
result from the aid programs.").
198. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 18-23 (discussing generally Russia's
nonproliferation assistance agreements with numerous Western nations).
199. See, e.g., id. at 3 (discussing the recent progress on resolving liability disputes that
have plagued the negotiation of Russia's nonproliferation assistance agreements with
European nations).
200. Id. at 20 (describing the EBRD Agreement).
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Agreement, Russia agreed to indemnify any party acting pursuant
to any assistance program linked to the agreement, unless the
incident giving rise to the damages results from premeditated
actions." 1 Importantly, the EBRD Agreement only covers assistance
programs that deal exclusively with Russia's civilian nuclear power
sector, and it will no longer be in effect when Russia fully joins the
international civilian nuclear power liability regime." 2 Norway and
Russia have finalized a liability agreement that is very similar to
the EBRD Agreement, although it covers both civilian and military
activities.2 ' France and Germany have entered into agreements
with Russia independently and jointly that employ essentially the
same terms as those found in the EBRD Agreement and the
Norway-Russia Agreement.20 4 All of the agreements with Russia
into which European nations have entered can be distinguished
from the Umbrella Agreement in that the former all contain
201. The EBRD Agreement's liability provision reads as follows:
With the exception of claims for damage or injury against individuals arising
from their premeditated actions the Government of the Russian Federation
irrevocably guarantees that it shall keep the Administrator, its employees,
agents and subcontractors, both during and after the term of this Agreement,
fully and effectively indemnified from and against any and all actions, claims,
losses, liabilities, expenses or damages in connection with the Project or any
relevant grant agreement, whether in or outside of the Russian Federation.
Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development Relating to Nuclear Safety Account Projects in the Russian
Federation, with Annexes, § 5.01, June 9, 1995, reprinted in Brubaker & Spector, supra note
18, at 35 n.90 (emphasis added).
202. See Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 20. For a discussion of the inability of the
international legal regime governing civilian nuclear power liability to provide much insight
into the liability dispute that plagues U.S.-Russian bilateral nonproliferation assistance
programs, see supra notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
203. See Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 20 (describing the Norway-Russia
Agreement); Morten BremerMaerli, Strengthening Cooperative Threat Reduction with Russia:
The Norwegian Experience (Norwegian Inst. of Int'l Affairs, Working Paper No. 633, 2002),
available at http://www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/NUPIwp633.pdf (surveying Norway's bilateral
nuclear assistance programs with Russia). The liability provisions in the Norway-Russia
Agreement are substantially similar to those in the EBRD Agreement. Brubaker & Spector,
supra note 18, at 20; see also Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation
and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on Environmental Cooperation in Connection
with the Dismantling of Russian Nuclear Powered Submarines Withdrawn from the Navy's
Service in the Northern Region, and the Enhancement of Nuclear and Radiation Safety, Nor.-
Russ., art. 9, May 1998, reprinted in Maerli, supra, at 39-40.
204. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 20-21 (describing Russia's agreements with
France and Germany).
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language that provides complete liability protection for the donor
countries and their agents for all damage-causing incidents except
those arising from premeditated conduct.20 5 The Norway-Russia
Agreement also refers to utilization of United Nations arbitration
procedures in the event that a dispute arises concerning liability.2 °6
Russia has also explicitly reserved a right to defend itself under the
doctrine of state sovereign immunity in all liability agreements
regarding nonproliferation assistance programs, with the sole
exception of the Umbrella Agreement.2 7
In addition to the bilateral nonproliferation assistance that
Norway has provided to Russia for specific programs pursuant to
the Norway-Russia Agreement, Norway and the United States have
provided some assistance to Russia under a trilateral initiative,
the Norway-U.S.-Russia Arctic Military Cooperation Agreement
(AMEC).208 To govern liability in the event of a nuclear incident, the
United States explicitly linked its AMEC activities to the Umbrella
Agreement and Norway linked some of its activities to the Norway-
Russia Agreement.2 9 Very few projects have been completed under
AMEC, however, largely because of unique liability issues that arise
when considering trilateral nonproliferation assistance for the
dismantling of decommissioned Russian submarines. 2 11 U.S. in-volvement in AMEC expired in 2002 because of the lack of workable
205. Id. (discussing generally Russia's nonproliferation assistance agreements with
European nations); see also supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text (discussing the liability
provisions that govern Russia's nonproliferation assistance agreements with various
European nations).
206. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 20 & 35 n.93 (discussing the liability provision
found in the Norway-Russia Agreement).
207. Id. at 19, 25 (noting the differences between the Umbrella Agreement and other
nonproliferation assistance agreements to which Russia is a party).
208. For an overview of the AMEC initiative, see Maerli, supra note 203, at 17-19. See also
Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 3.
209. Morton Bremer Maerli, a Norwegian arms control expert, explains that
[a]fter a failed attempt to negotiate a trilateral framework, the United States
and Russia agreed in 1998 to have the legal coverage stipulated in the 1992 CTR
Umbrella Agreement apply to U.S. participation in the AMEC "nuclear" projects
(all of which are considered supportive of CTR objectives). The signing later in
1998 of the Framework Agreement between Russia and Norway provided legal
coverage for most projects in the Norwegian Plan of Action ....
Maerli, supra note 203, at 19; see also Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 3 (discussing
how liability issues would be dealt with under AMEC).
210. See Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 3 (noting that, because of disputes over
liability, only six AMEC projects have begun); Maerli, supra note 203, at 19.
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liability provisions, and Norway has declared that it will not
continue with AMEC activities absent continued U.S. participa-
tion.21' The United States has agreed to continue providing
leadership under AMEC while the negotiation of a new trilateral
liability regime occurs, although the prospect of either successfully
implementing AMEC projects or negotiating a mutually acceptable
liability regime under this arrangement remains uncertain.212
Recently, European assistance to Russia has received another
shot in the arm, as the twelve-country MNEPR21' has been ratified
completely by all parties to the negotiations, with the exception of
the United States, which has signed the agreement but not the
Liability Protocol.1 4 The MNEPR provides the framework for U.S.
and European assistance programs designed to aid Russia with
handling military nuclear waste and spent fuel.21 5 The Liability
Protocol of the MNEPR provides liability protection for donor
governments that is very similar to the protection provided by the
original NCI and PTSA agreements; it exempts donor governments
and contractors from all accidents that arise from any conduct other
than premeditated acts.21 ' It also allows non-Russian parties to refer
211. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 3; Maerli, supra note 203, at 19.
212. Maerli, supra note 203, at 19 ("Negotiations have now been resumed for a trilateral
agreement providing separate legal coverage for AMEC projects.... At the time of writing of
this report, however, the AMEC-continuation remains uncertain.").
213. MNEPR, supra note 167. The liability provisions of the MNEPR are contained in a
separate protocol. Protocol on Claims, Legal Proceedings and Indemnification to the
Framework Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Programme in the Russian
Federation, May 21, 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 155) 43 [hereinafter MNEPR Liability Protocol],
available at http://www.sgpproject. org/MNEPRProtocol.pdf; see also Ann MacLachlan, Duma
Ratifies MNEPR Accord; Minatom Rejects Liability Language, NUCLEAR FUEL, Dec. 8, 2003,
at 8 (describing the MNEPR Liability Protocol and U.S. objections to the language).
214. Ann MacLachlan, Final Agreement Near on Pact for Nuclear Cleanup in Russia,
NUCLEONICS WK., May 19, 2004, at 9 (listing the parties that have ratified the MNEPR and
noting that the United States has signed the MNEPR but not the MNEPR Liability Protocol
"because it seeks more stringent liability protection, similar to that embodied in the
Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement of 1992 which governs work by U.S. contractors in
Russia").
215. See, e.g., Egil Tronstad & Cristina Chuen, The Multilateral Nuclear Environmental
Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR), GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP RESOURCE PAGE OF THE
CENTER FOR NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES, 2003, http://cns.miis.edu/research/globpart/030604.
htm (describing the MNEPR generally).
216. The MNEPR Liability Protocol provides:
1. With the exception of claims for injury or damage against individuals arising
from omissions or acts of such individuals done with intent to cause injury or
damage, the Russian Party shall bring no claims or legal proceedings of any kind
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any disputes to arbitration,21 7 similar to a provision in the Norway-
Russia Agreement.21 8 Although the United States rejected the
MNEPR Liability Protocol,219 its provisions may provide a good
starting point for a new U.S.-Russian agreement on CTR liability,
assuming that additional protections could be inserted to address
the United States' fears of Russian adjudication of what constitutes
a premeditated act.22 °
C. Damage Caps and Insurance Agreements
Because the risk and magnitude of the damage resulting from a
nuclear incident is so great, both Russia and the United States are
understandably wary of any agreement that would result in either
country or their contractors being held solely responsible for paying
against the Contributors and their personnel or contractors, subcontractors,
consultants, suppliers or subsuppliers of equipment, goods or services at any tier
and their personnel, for any loss or damage of whatsoever nature, including but
not limited to personal injury, loss of life, direct, indirect and consequential
damage to property owned by the Russian Federation arising from activities
undertaken pursuant to the Agreement. This paragraph shall not apply to the
enforcement of the express provisions of a contract.
2. With the exception of claims for Nuclear Damage against individuals arising
from omissions or acts of such individuals done with intent to cause damage, the
Russian Party shall provide for the adequate legal defence of and indemnify, and
shall bring no claims or legal proceedings against the Contributors and their
personnel, or any contractors, subcontractors, consultants, suppliers, or
subsuppliers of equipment, goods or services at any tier and their personnel in
connection with third-party claims, in any court or forum, arising from activities
undertaken pursuant to the Agreement, for Nuclear Damage occurring within
or outside the territory of the Russian Federation, that results from a Nuclear
Incident occurring within the territory of the Russian Federation.
MNEPR Liability Protocol, supra note 167, art. 2, paras. 1-2 (emphasis added).
217. Regarding arbitration, the MNEPR Liability Protocol provides that
[c]ontributors, contractors, subcontractors, consultants, suppliers or
subsuppliers of equipment, goods or services at any tier and their personnel may
refer any dispute concerning the implementation of obligations under this
Article to arbitration in accordance with UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, if such
dispute has not been resolved amicably within ninety days of its submission to
the Russian Party. Any arbitration award shall be final and binding on the
parties to the dispute.
MNEPR Liability Protocol, supra note 167, art. 2, para. 6.
218. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
220. For a discussion of the risks of leaving the interpretation of the term "premeditation"
in the hands of Russian courts, see supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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an entire damage award.22 1 Accordingly, incorporating damage caps,
which would limit the amount that any single party would be
required to pay in the event of a nuclear incident, into the liability
provisions that govern the implementation of CTR projects could
make both countries more willing to accept provisions that poten-
tially expose them and their contractors to greater liability. Both
parties, however, have an interest in ensuring that all victims are
compensated fully for any damages that result from a nuclear
incident.222 Accordingly, coupling liability provisions that cap the
liable party's maximum damage payment with a mechanism that
provides extensive insurance to pay the difference between the
actual costs of all of the damage and the negotiated maximum is
necessary to assuage both parties' fears of unlimited liability. 3
One mechanism for providing insurance is a pooling agreement
in which each donor nation that gives any nonproliferation assis-
tance to Russia would pay a portion of its assistance into a general
fund that would be reserved for covering any uncompensated
damages in the event of a nuclear incident that occurs pursuant
to the implementation of any donor nation's nonproliferation
assistance program.22 4 This proposal would calm the fears of
contractors and donor governments concerning unlimited liability,
while ensuring that all victims of a nuclear incident are fully
compensated. Unfortunately, such a proposal would likely require
a lengthy multilateral negotiation, rendering it an infeasible short-
term solution.22 5
A second mechanism that could ensure full compensation for the
victims of a nuclear incident, while capping the amount of damages
that liable parties would be obligated to pay, is the transfer of risk
221. See supra Part II.A.2.
222. See supra notes 118, 122 and accompanying text.
223. The damage cap could be set at $400 million, leaving any additional damages to be
paid from the insurance mechanism. This is the approach that is employed by the
international legal regime that governs civilian nuclear power plant accidents, effectively
spreading the risk among all states that engage in potentially risky nuclear activities. See
supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
224. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 27-28 (proposing and discussing the benefits
of a multilateral insurance pooling agreement).
225. NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION CAMPAIGN, supra note 111, ch. II, pt. 18 at 3-4 ("The
creation of either [a retrospective payment pool or a system of catastrophe insurance bonds]
would obviously be a time-consuming and challenging task involving several countries and
a host of difficult details to be worked out on an equitable basis.").
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to international capital markets by issuance of high-yield catastro-
phe insurance bonds with risk periods of several years by "insurers
of nuclear operations, a pool of nuclear operators, or a dedicated
intergovernmental institution. '226 The capital generated by issuing
catastrophe bonds would be invested in low-risk government bonds,
with all donor states that provide nonproliferation assistance to
Russia increasing their payments by a small amount to cover the
difference between the interest generated by the government bonds
and the interest payments made to the catastrophe bondholders.227
In the event of a nuclear incident, the issuer would not be required
to repay the principal on the catastrophe bonds, but instead would
use the capital generated by issuing the bonds to cover any damages
that result from the incident.228 Without extraordinarily high
premiums, investors will likely be wary of carrying the significant
risks associated with nuclear activities.229 Accordingly, the costs
to donor nations will necessarily increase, or investors will not
purchase the bonds and the amount of coverage that will be
available to compensate the victims of a nuclear incident will be
inadequate.23 o Additionally, establishing the mechanism for issuing
catastrophe bonds could entail a lengthy negotiating process, 211 and
the issuance of such bonds may only "be feasible in the civilian
nuclear sector. 23 2
D. Choice-of-Law, Choice-of-Forum, and Arbitration Provisions
One of the most prominent arguments advanced by the United
States in favor of requiring absolute immunity and indemnification
for its contractors is the fear that Russian courts will interpret any
226. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 28-29 (proposing and discussing the benefits
of issuing catastrophe insurance bonds). For a more thorough discussion of catastrophe bonds,
see Todd V. McMillan, Securitization and the Catastrophe Bond: A Transactional Integration
of Industries Through a Capacity-Enhancing Product of Risk Management, 8 CoNN. INS. L.J.
131, 138-42 (2001).
227. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 28.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. (arguing that investors may be reluctant to "invest in nuclear catastrophe bonds
... except at extremely high premiums").
231. See supra note 225.
232. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 28 (noting that states assume all liability for
military activities generally).
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exception to absolute immunity broadly, exposing U.S. contractors
to potentially unlimited liability."' Incorporating explicit choice-of-
law provisions, which would require the application of U.S. tort law
regardless of where a trial is held to decide any claims brought
against U.S. contractors, into the liability provisions that govern
nonproliferation assistance programs may assuage this fear to some
extent.23 4 Specifying the applicable law would resolve some of the
uncertainty regarding how terms like "premeditated" are defined
and applied.2 35 If the United States' true concern is manipulation of
the Russian judicial system, however, simply requesting that
Russian courts apply U.S. law may not adequately provide accept-
able levels of protection to U.S. contractors.2 36 Accordingly, a choice-
of-law provision may need to be coupled with a provision that
requires that all claims against U.S. contractors be litigated in U.S.
courts.23 ' Similarly, a provision that allows the United States or its
contractors to opt for third-party arbitration to decide claims that
arise pursuant to CTR activities would enable those parties to avoid
trial in the Russian legal system.238 The MNEPR Liability Protocol
contains such a provision,239 which seems to address a primary
concern of the United States, although the United States has not
ratified the MNEPR Liability Protocol and seems unlikely to do so
in the future.2 4 °
233. See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
234. See generally Christopher L. Ingrim, Choice-of-Law Clauses: Their Effect on
Extraterritorial Analysis-A Scholar's Dream, a Practitioner's Nightmare, 28 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 663 (1995) (discussing the utility of choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions in
international agreements).
235. Christopher Ingrim highlighted the Supreme Court's assessment that
[u]ncertainty will almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract touching
two or more countries, each with its own substantive laws and conflict-of-laws
rules. A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes
shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any
international business transaction.
Id. at 677 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974)).
236. See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text (discussing the risk of corruption and
manipulation in the Russian legal system).
237. See supra note 235 (indicating that provisions that specify the forum and the
applicable law are necessary for predictability in international legal relationships).
238. See NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION CAMPAIGN, supra note 111, ch. II, pt. 18 at 2
(discussing the arbitration clause in the MNEPR Liability Protocol).
239. See supra note 217.
240. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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E. Equipment Specification Provisions and Warranties
Given the risk and magnitude of a nuclear incident,24 1 Russia has
a legitimate interest in ensuring that the equipment and services
provided for CTR activities by U.S. contractors and equipment
suppliers are free from defect.24 2 Establishing minimum technical
standards for any U.S.-supplied equipment and allowing Russia to
certify all equipment before it is used may alleviate Russia's fears
that a nuclear incident will arise because of equipment malfunc-
tions.24 Several CTR implementing agreements have utilized this
approach, as the varied equipment that may be needed to imple-
ment particular CTR projects makes it difficult to establish blanket
standards that apply to all equipment transfers.244 Accordingly,
project-specific technical standards can be integrated into each CTR
implementing agreement, providing the specifications for the
particular equipment that will be used for the specific project
covered by the agreement.245 In the case of CTR agreements that
have already been negotiated, supplemental technical agreements
can be established as part of the implementation process "without
engaging in the formal amendment process."24 Unfortunately,
several CTR projects require highly specialized equipment and the
negotiation of mutually acceptable minimum technical standards
could require a lengthy joint development and testing process.247
Moreover, some technologies may be so advanced that defects will
not be discovered easily, especially if similar equipment has never
241. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the significant damage that could result from a
nuclear incident).
242. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing Russia's legitimate concerns
regarding defective equipment that is supplied pursuant to nonproliferation agreements).
243. Beard, supra note 13, at 919 (suggesting the desirability of minimum technical
standards for U.S.-supplied equipment for CTR projects); Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18,
at 5 ("Russia has sought to mitigate some of these risks by providing in many agreements that
it have the right to certify Western-supplied equipment before it is put to use in Russian
facilities.').
244. Beard, supra note 13, at 919-20 (listing examples of CTR implementing agreements
that have incorporated minimum technical standards for U.S.-supplied equipment).
245. Id. at 919.
246. Id. at 920.
247. Id. at 919-20 (giving several examples of highly specialized equipment and noting the
resulting difficulty in establishing minimum technical standards).
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been manufactured or used previously in Russia.24 Currently, the
United States retains the exclusive right to ultimately determine
the technical standards that will govern equipment provided for
CTR projects, although Russia is permitted to make recommenda-
tions.1
4 1
In addition to minimum technical standards, the United States
may be able to protect its contractors by explicitly disclaiming
responsibility for any nuclear incidents that arise from equipment
or training failures.25 ° Past CTR implementing agreements have
"express[ed] the limited nature of any warranties or guarantees
associated with the performance of U.S.-provided assistance,"
including material, training, services, equipment, property, and
supplies.251 Fearing the enormous damages that may result from a
nuclear accident, Russia is likely to reject such a broad disclaimer,
although it may be more acceptable if Russia were given the right
to establish minimum technical standards for any U.S.-supplied
equipment and certify all equipment before using it.252
F. A Workable Solution: A Hybrid Approach
The United States and Russia must address two broad issues in
any liability agreement. First, the provisions of the agreement must
indicate precisely how it will be determined which party is liable for
damages caused by a nuclear incident that occurs pursuant to the
implementation of a CTR project. Neither party is willing to accept
unlimited liability, and the method for allocating responsibility
must be mutually acceptable to both nations. Second, any agree-
ment on nuclear liability must ensure that the full damages will be
paid. If the provisions of the agreement are likely to leave any of
the victims of a nuclear accident uncompensated, it will not be
acceptable to either side, particularly Russia, where the victims are
248. Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 5-6 (offering the example of a complex, but
defective, computer code that had never before been used in Russia and was so technologically
advanced that the U.S. supplier was unaware of its defects).
249. Beard, supra note 13, at 920.
250. See id. at 918.
251. Id. (surveying the limited warranties and guarantees in a number of CTR
implementing agreements).
252. See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
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likely to reside.25 Given the various interests and the resulting
policy positions of both the United States and Russia,2 54 it is likely
that any mutually acceptable solution to the current liability
impasse will have to incorporate a number of the foregoing solutions
to adequately address the legitimate concerns of both parties. Both
countries have a clear interest in engaging in nonproliferation
projects, including the NCI, the PSTA, and the PMDA.255 Russia's
interests in safe implementation of CTR projects and ensuring full
compensation for the victims of a nuclear incident256 must be
balanced against the United States' interests in reducing threats to
its national security, while limiting potential liability for itself and
its contractors.257
The provisions of the MNEPR Liability Protocol provide a good
starting point for an acceptable solution to the liability impasse.
Russia has clearly rejected the broad exemptions from liability and
indemnity that characterize the Umbrella Agreement. 25  As
demonstrated by Russia's acceptance of the MNEPR Liability
Protocol and agreements containing similar provisions with other
European nations, however, it is clear that Russia is willing to offer
broad liability waivers and indemnification to donor states and
contractors if those states agree to impose responsibility on any
party that is responsible for incidents arising from premeditated
acts.259 The United States' main objection to this type of provision
concerns uncertainty regarding how Russian courts will interpret
the term "premeditated," especially given the corruption that is
endemic to the fledgling Russian legal system.2' Accordingly,
explicit choice-of-law provisions that require the application of
existing U.S. tort law to provide the relevant standards for deter-
mining whether an act is premeditated could blunt the force of the
253. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
254. See supra Part II.C-D (outlining the policy positions of the United States and Russia
concerning liability provisions for bilateral nonproliferation assistance programs).
255. See supra notes 117, 120, 155, 176 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 118, 173 and accompanying text.
257. See supra Part iI.C.
258. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; supra note 156.
259. See supra note 156; supra text accompanying note 168.
260. See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
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United States' objection. 6' If the fear remains that Russian courts
will manipulate and interpret U.S. law broadly, a choice-of-law
provision may need to be coupled with a choice-of-forum or arbitra-
tion provision that allows non-Russian defendants to remove any
lawsuits from Russian courts.262
In addition to addressing the issues of who should be liable and
how liability should be determined in lawsuits brought pursuant to
damages suffered from nuclear incidents resulting from implemen-
tation of nonproliferation programs, any mutually acceptable
liability provisions must address the issue of the availability of
full compensation for damages. Although difficult to negotiate,
multilateral pooling agreements seem to provide the most feasible
alternative.2  Pooling agreements have been successfully negotiated
and employed in the civilian nuclear power context,26 4 and they
would serve the interests of both parties by ensuring that adequate
funds exist to compensate all victims of a nuclear incident for the
entirety of the injuries suffered, while not placing the onus for
providing the entire award on any single party. This would allow a
damage cap to be established that would limit the total amount of
damages that any single party would be required to pay, further
alleviating the United States' main concern by capping its contrac-
tors' potential liability.2 5 It also serves Russia's interests by
ensuring that victims are adequately compensated. 2' Both parties'
joint interest in allowing nonproliferation activities to proceed
would be served.267
Given Russia's recent acceptance of the MNEPR, a hybrid
approach that combines terms similar to those in the MNEPR
Liability Protocol with a damage cap and a compensation pooling
agreement seems to be acceptable to the Duma. Similarly, a solution
261. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text (arguing in favor of choice-of-law
provisions).
262. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of choice-of.
forum provisions).
263. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text (discussing multilateral pooling
agreements).
264. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text (explaining and discussing the purpose
of damage caps).
266. See supra notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 117, 120, 155, 176 and accompanying text.
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that provides for contractor liability only in cases of premeditated
actions, coupled with damage caps and the ability to remove any
case from the Russian court system, should prove acceptable to both
the United States government and U.S. contractors. This broad
framework could be codified in an agreement that is similar to the
Umbrella Agreement, providing the liability provisions that govern
all U.S.-Russian bilateral nonproliferation assistance agreements. 26
Additional protections for both parties could also be negotiated on
a case-by-case basis and integrated into the implementing agree-
ments that specify the terms governing particular CTR projects. The
optimal liability provisions for any particular nonproliferation
agreement are likely to vary in scope, depending on the type of
activity proposed.269 For example, the NCI focuses on defense
conversion, which is much less risky than the construction of a MOX
fabrication plant or the burning of MOX fuel in a reactor."'
Accordingly, the United States may be more willing to accept
greater limits on liability protection for NCI activities than for
activities conducted pursuant to the PSTA or the PMDA. 27 1 Russia's
268. Although the Umbrella Agreement applies only to DOD CTR projects, see Bernier,
supra note 76, at 92, the CTR program has expanded since its inception and several projects
are now being implemented by the DOE, including the NCI, the PSTA, and the PMDA. See
supra notes 73-74, 86-90, 99 and accompanying text; see also supra note 11. Accordingly, any
new liability framework that is negotiated should apply to all CTR projects.
269. See Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 6-7.
270. For a discussion of the unique risks that accompany plutonium disposition activities,
see supra notes 106, 129-30 and accompanying text. See also Brubaker & Spector, supra note
18, at 7 (suggesting that plutonium disposition activities produce some of the greatest risks
of any CTR activities).
271. Brubaker and Spector note that different levels of risk may alter the level of risk that
the parties to nonproliferation assistance agreements are willing to assume:
Mhe potential magnitude of nuclear damage involved in a particular incident
may, itself, have an impact on the attractiveness of various liability and
compensation arrangements for the activity involved and the related assistance
programs.... [I]t may be useful to categorize activities in terms of the potential
magnitude of nuclear damage they may engender.... A number of states
recognize the distinction between high-level and low-level risk through specific
provisions in their domestic nuclear laws, which establish significantly higher
limits of liability for nuclear damage arising from [the most serious incidents]
.... This distinction suggests that, in negotiating liability and compensation
arrangements, donor states and Russia might consider adopting approaches
dependent on the magnitude of potential nuclear damage specific programs
might entail. It is possible to imagine Russia, for example, being willing to
accept unconditional liability for programs ... whose potential for nuclear
damages falls toward the lower end of the scale, while insisting upon shared
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commitment to using its plutonium for producing energy272 may also
induce greater willingness on Russia's part to accept more responsi-
bility for PSTA or PMDA activities because it will receive benefits
from the program beyond the security benefits of disposing of
plutonium. Moreover, depending on the type of equipment required
to implement particular CTR projects, the United States could
negotiate a disclaimer of all warranties or guarantees on the
equipment, training, and services provided, or Russia could
negotiate minimum technical standards for the same, if additional
protection for either party is desirable or necessary, based on the
nature of the particular project.273
G. Interim Solutions
Establishing an entirely new liability framework that will govern
U.S.-Russian nonproliferation assistance programs is likely to
require a lengthy negotiation process, especially if it includes
multilateral aspects.274 Given the importance of the NCI and
plutonium disposition activities, an interim solution that would
allow these projects to continue while the details of a new liability
agreement are hammered out is necessary.25 There are two
potential interim solutions. First, the United States and Russia
could extend the projects temporarily for several months or a year
at a time, promising to work in earnest toward achieving a truly
mutually acceptable solution to the liability impasse that caused the
agreements to lapse in the first place.27 ' The second interim solution
is specifically targeted at allowing the plutonium disposition
liability for programs with potentially graver consequences.
Brubaker & Spector, supra note 18, at 6-7.
272. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
273. See supra Part III.E (discussing equipment specification provisions and warranties).
274. See supra note 225.
275. NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION CAMPAIGN, supra note 111, ch. II, pt. 18 at 4.
276. The Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign notes that
[t]he idea of one-year extensions while negotiations over the liability issue
continue was proposed to the [U.S.] Administration before the agreements had
expired and apparently was rejected.... If the Administration were to decide that
a multilateral solution along the lines suggested by Brubaker and Spector or
some variant thereof were worth pursuing, perhaps temporary extensions of
[CTR] programs might be possible.
Id. (endnote omitted).
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agreements to be implemented while official liability negotiations
take place. Because the MNEPR has already been concluded and
ratified by France and Russia, France could, with the consent of the
United States, take the lead role in providing Russia with MOX
fabrication technology until the United States and Russia have
completed a satisfactory agreement that would allow the United
States to participate fully in providing technical assistance.277
CONCLUSION
The risk that terrorists or hostile states that are determined to
cause mass destruction in the United States will acquire nuclear
material or knowledge is frighteningly real. The most effective
means of countering this threat is downsizing Russia's nuclear
weapons complex, providing employment to former nuclear weapons
scientists, eliminating surplus weapons-grade material, and
ensuring that remaining stocks of nuclear weapons and fissile
material remain secure. Bilateral nonproliferation assistance
agreements between the United States and Russia are critical to
this effort, as Russia's crumbling nuclear infrastructure and
inadequate security measures afford terrorists an opportunity to
acquire nuclear material and knowledge. Unfortunately, disputes
between the two nations concerning liability issues have impeded
the full completion of several important nonproliferation projects,
most notably the NCI and the plutonium disposition program.
A new approach is needed to bridge the gap between the positions
of the United States and Russia concerning liability in the event
that a nuclear incident occurs pursuant to the implementation of
bilateral nonproliferation projects. Both the United States and
Russia are likely to be satisfied with a new umbrella agreement that
holds the United States and its contractors liable only in the case of
a premeditated act that causes damage, coupled with provisions
that allow claims to be adjudicated in accordance with U.S. tort law.
277. Daniel Homer & Ann MacLachlan, DOE Using "French Option"to Send MOX Design
Information to Russia, NUCLEAR FUEL, Nov. 22, 2004, at 6; Daniel Homer, U.S. Pursuing
T rench Option" as Interim Fix on Pu Liability, NUCLEAR FUEL, May 24, 2004, at 4. But see
Daniel Homer & Ann MacLachlan, Effort To Bypass Liability Issues for Russian MOX Plant
Not Working, NUCLEAR FUEL, May 23, 2005, at 3 (describing several issues that have
prevented France from transferring MOX technology to Russia under the "French option"
plan, including failure of the United States and Russia to resolve the liability dispute).
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Moreover, establishing a multilateral pooling agreement that would
cap the amount of damages that any single party would be required
to pay to victims of a nuclear incident, while ensuring that all
victims are fully compensated, would further spread the risk of
engaging in nonproliferation activities and make any new umbrella
agreement more acceptable to both the United States and Russia.
Additional project-specific protections could be established in the
implementing agreements for any particularly risky CTR projects.
In the interim, a number of temporary solutions can ensure that
the nonproliferation projects continue while the negotiations for a
new liability framework that will govern all future U.S.-Russian
CTR activities take place. The alternative to continued progress in
securing Russia's nuclear material and knowledge is a world of
widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons to terrorists and hostile
states, seriously threatening the United States and the world with
the prospect that such weapons will be used to cause incredible
levels of death and destruction.
AUTHOR'S NOTE
On July 19, 2005, news media in both the United States and
Russia reported that the two countries had agreed in principle on
the terms of a new liability agreement that would cover plutonium
disposition activities conducted pursuant to the PMDA.27s The exact
terms of the new agreement have not been released,27 9 but reports
discussing the July 2005 negotiation indicate that the new liability
agreement contains provisions that mirror those of the MNEPR
278. See, e.g., Andy Lenderman, New Mexico Senator Shepherds Plan for Russian Nuke
Material, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, July 28, 2005, at A6; Simon Saradzhyan, Key Nuclear
Dispute Is Resolved, MOSCOW TIMES, July 20, 2005, at 2, available at http://www.
themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/07/20/010.html; Press Release, Senator Pete V. Domenici,
Long-Awaited U.S.-Russia Plutonium Liability Agreement Is Critical Step in Right Direction
(July 19, 2005), available at http://domenici.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=240897; Costa,
supra note 159; Moscow, Washington Resolve Liability Dispute Over U.S.-Funded Nuclear
Security Program, GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE, July 20, 2005, http://www.nti.orgt
dnewswireissues/2005_7_20.html [hereinafter Liability Resolution].
279. See Saradzhyan, supra note 278, at 2 (quoting Ivan Safranchuk, head of the Moscow
office of the Center for Defense Information, who indicated that Russian officials will not
publicly disclose the terms of the new agreement "in order to avoid riling the [Russian]
public'); Costa, supra note 159 (indicating that U.S. officials have declined to comment on the
substance of the new liability agreement until it is signed by both countries).
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Liability Protocol.2' Neither the United States nor Russia has taken
any steps to formally approve the new agreement, despite several
commentators' predictions that it would enter into force soon after
negotiations ended.28  The new liability agreement must first go
through an interagency review process within the Russian govern-
ment,2 2 and then other high-level Russian officials must accept its
terms "to complete Moscow's approval process. 28 3 Only after
Russia's internal review process has concluded may President Putin
issue a presidential decree publicly announcing the terms of the
agreement, and then both nations must officially sign the agree-
ment.2 4 Finally, the Duma must formally ratify the agreement, and
it will enter into force.28 5
Although it is unknown when the United States and Russia will
act to ratify the new liability agreement, most commentators believe
that it will eventually enter into force. 2 6 As an interim solution, the
United States and Russia may apply the agreement on a "provi-
sional basis ... if the Duma approval process appears likely to
impose a long delay," although "such an arrangement cannot be put
into place until the agreement is signed [by both countries]."287
280. Sprenger, supra note 158 ("In the [new liability agreement], the United States gave
up its claim for blanket protection, and the two countries set up a process for handling a
situation in which an individual deliberately causes damage in the country in which he is
working .....); Press Release, Russian Am. Nuclear Sec. Advisory Council, Liability Agreement
with Russia a Reversal of U.S. Hard Line (July 21, 2005), available at http://www.ransac.
org/Projects%20and %20Publications/News/News%20Releases/index.asp ("IThe United States
has reportedly accepted provisions similar to those contained in the [MNEPR Liability
Protocol].").
281. See Daniel Homer & Ann MacLachlan, DCS Consortium Sets New Schedule for
Submitting MOX License Request, NUCLEAR FUEL, Sept. 12, 2005, at 4 (noting that neither
country has taken any steps toward ratification of the new liability agreement).
282. Id.; Liability Resolution, supra note 278 (noting that "[s]everal Russian government
agencies would have to approve the deal before it is formalized as an addendum to [the
PMDA]").
283. Sprenger, supra note 158.
284. Press Release, Senator Pete V. Domenici, supra note 278; Liability Resolution, supra
note 278.
285. Homer & MacLachlan, supra note 281, at 4; Press Release, Senator Pete V. Domenici,
supra note 278. The U.S. Congress does not need to approve the new liability agreement
"because it is an executive agreement that can enter into force solely through presidential
authority." Sprenger, supra note 158; see also Homer & MacLachlan, supra note 281, at 4.
286. See, e.g., Josh Gelinas, Officials Show MOX Support, AUGUSTA CHRON. (Ga.), Oct. 15,
2005, at B1; Sprenger, supra note 158.
287. Homer & MacLachlan, supra note 281, at 4.
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Even if the countries quickly approve the new liability agreement
and it enters into force, it will not resolve the underlying liability
dispute that plagues U.S.-Russian nonproliferation assistance
programs. The new liability agreement only covers PMDA activities
and not the NCI or other future programs. 2"8 Accordingly, the
United States and Russia will have to revisit the issue of liability
protection for the NCI and existing DOD CTR programs that
continue to operate under the Umbrella Agreement, which will
expire in June 2006.2"9 In fact, the new liability agreement may
make future negotiations to revise and extend the Umbrella
Agreement more difficult:
U.S. officials have insisted that the plutonium disposition
liability settlement would be a one-time deal. However, Russian
officials may view the new agreement as a precedent and seek
to revise the unfavorable terms of the broader CTR agreement.
This could set the stage for another round of contentious
negotiations and possibly grind to a halt a broad swath of
programs.2 °
Accordingly, the liability dispute between the United States and
Russia will persist into the future, despite the recent agreement
that covers plutonium disposition activities. At best, this new lia-
bility agreement will serve as a partial, interim solution 9 1 while the
United States and Russia negotiate a new umbrella agreement that
will fully resolve the liability dispute that continues to hinder the
progress of U.S.-Russian nonproliferation assistance programs.292
Patrick F. Speice, Jr.*
288. See sources cited supra note 278 (announcing the new liability agreement and
discussing the activities to which it applies).
289. See Luongo & Hoehn, supra note 11, at 29; Sprenger, supra note 158; Press Release,
Russian Am. Nuclear Sec. Advisory Council, supra note 280.
290. Press Release, Russian Am. Nuclear Sec. Advisory Council, supra note 280; see also
Luongo & Hoehn, supra note 11, at 30 (noting that even if the United States and Russia
compromise on liability provisions to govern plutonium disposition activities, the United
States "will maintain a firm stance in other liability negotiations").
291. For a discussion of other possible interim solutions, see supra Part III.G.
292. See supra Part III.F (proposing a comprehensive solution to the liability dispute).
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